so they may, upon like occasions, still continue to use the same phrase, without any deviation either from propriety of language, or the truth of things.  But, if the term same be used in the acceptation of philosophers, who pretend to an abstracted notion of identity, then, according to their sundry definitions of this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that philosophic identity consists), it may or may not be possible for divers persons to perceive the same thing.  But whether philosophers shall think fit to call a thing the same or no, is, I conceive, of small importance.  Let us suppose several men together, all endued with the same faculties, and consequently affected in like sort by their senses, and who had yet never known the use of language; they would, without question, agree in their perceptions.  Though perhaps, when they came to the use of speech, some regarding the uniformness of what was perceived, might call it the same thing:  others, especially regarding the diversity of persons who perceived, might choose the denomination of different things.  But who sees not that all the dispute is about a word? to wit, whether. what is perceived by different persons may yet have the term same applied to it?  Or, suppose a house, whose walls or outward shell remaining unaltered, the chambers are all pulled down, and new ones built in their place; and that you should call this the same, and I should say it was not the same house.—­would we not, for all this, perfectly agree in our thoughts of the house, considered in itself?  And would not all the difference consist in a sound?  If you should say, We differed in our notions; for that you super-added to your idea of the house the simple abstracted idea of identity, whereas I did not; I would tell you, I know not what you mean by the abstracted idea of identity; and should desire you to look into your own thoughts, and be sure you understood yourself.—­Why so silent, Hylas?  Are you not yet satisfied men may dispute about identity and diversity, without any real difference in their thoughts and opinions, abstracted from names?  Take this farther reflexion with you:  that whether Matter be allowed to exist or no, the case is exactly the same as to the point in hand.  For the Materialists themselves acknowledge what we immediately perceive by our senses to be our own ideas.  Your difficulty, therefore, that no two see the same thing, makes equally against the Materialists and me.

HYL.  Ay, Philonous, but they suppose an external archetype, to which referring their several ideas they may truly be said to perceive the same thing.

Phil.  And (not to mention your having discarded those archetypes) so may you suppose an external archetype on my principles;—­external, I mean, to your own mind:  though indeed it must be’ supposed to exist in that Mind which comprehends all things; but then, this serves all the ends of identity, as well as if it existed out of a mind.  And I am sure you yourself will not say it is less intelligible.