Phil.  Now, if you can prove that any philosopher has explained the production of any one idea in our minds by the help of matter, I shall for ever acquiesce, and look on all that hath been said against it as nothing; but, if you cannot, it is vain to urge the explication of phenomena.  That a Being endowed with knowledge and will should produce or exhibit ideas is easily understood.  But that a Being which is utterly destitute of these faculties should be able to produce ideas, or in any sort to affect an intelligence, this I can never understand.  This I say, though we had some positive conception of Matter, though we knew its qualities, and could comprehend its existence, would yet be so far from explaining things, that it is itself the most inexplicable thing in the world.  And yet, for all this, it will not follow that philosophers have been doing nothing; for, by observing and reasoning upon the connexion of ideas, they discover the laws and methods of nature, which is a part of knowledge both useful and entertaining.

HYL.  After all, can it be supposed God would deceive all mankind?  Do you imagine He would have induced the whole world to believe the being of Matter, if there was no such thing?

Phil.  That every epidemical opinion, arising from prejudice, or passion, or thoughtlessness, may be imputed to God, as the Author of it, I believe you will not affirm.  Whatsoever opinion we father on Him, it must be either because He has discovered it to us by supernatural revelation; or because it is so evident to our natural faculties, which were framed and given us by God, that it is impossible we should withhold our assent from it.  But where is the revelation? or where is the evidence that extorts the belief of Matter?  Nay, how does it appear, that Matter, taken for something distinct from what we perceive by our senses, is thought to exist by all mankind; or indeed, by any except a few philosophers, who do not know what they would be at?  Your question supposes these points are clear; and, when you have cleared them, I shall think myself obliged to give you another answer.  In the meantime, let it suffice that I tell you, I do not suppose God has deceived mankind at all.

HYL.  But the novelty, Philonous, the novelty!  There lies the danger.  New notions should always be discountenanced; they unsettle men’s minds, and nobody knows where they will end.

Phil.  Why the rejecting a notion that has no foundation, either in sense, or in reason, or in Divine authority, should be thought to unsettle the belief of such opinions as are grounded on all or any of these, I cannot imagine.  That innovations in government and religion are dangerous, and ought to be discountenanced, I freely own.  But is there the like reason why they should be discouraged in philosophy?  The making anything known which was unknown before