On the contrary, I know that nothing inconsistent can exist, and that the existence of Matter implies an inconsistency.  Farther, I know what I mean when I affirm that there is a spiritual substance or support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and perceives ideas.  But, I do not know what is meant when it is said that an unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports either ideas or the archetypes of ideas.  There is therefore upon the whole no parity of case between Spirit and Matter.

HYL.  I own myself satisfied in this point.  But, do you in earnest think the real existence of sensible things consists in their being actually perceived?  If so; how comes it that all mankind distinguish between them?  Ask the first man you meet, and he shall tell you, to be perceived is one thing, and to exist is another.

Phil. I am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common sense of the world for the truth of my notion.  Ask the gardener why he thinks yonder cherry-tree exists in the garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees and feels it; in a word, because he perceives it by his senses.  Ask him why he thinks an orange-tree not to be there, and he shall tell you, because he does not perceive it.  What he perceives by sense, that he terms a real, being, and saith it is or exists; but, that which is not perceivable, the same, he saith, hath no being.

HYL.  Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible thing consists in being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived.

Phil.  And what is perceivable but an idea?  And can an idea exist without being actually perceived?  These are points long since agreed between us.

HYL.  But, be your opinion never so true, yet surely you will not deny it is shocking, and contrary to the common sense of men.  Ask the fellow whether yonder tree hath an existence out of his mind:  what answer think you he would make?

Phil.  The same that I should myself, to wit, that it doth exist out of his mind.  But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to say, the real tree, existing without his mind, is truly known and comprehended by (that is exists in) the infinite mind of God.  Probably he may not at first glance be aware of the direct and immediate proof there is of this; inasmuch as the very being of a tree, or any other sensible thing, implies a mind wherein it is.  But the point itself he cannot deny.  The question between the Materialists and me is not, whether things have a real existence out of the mind of this or that person, but whether they have an absolute existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and exterior to all minds.  This indeed some heathens and philosophers have affirmed, but whoever entertains notions of the Deity suitable to the Holy Scriptures will be of another opinion.

HYL.  But, according to your notions, what difference is there between real things, and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a dream—­since they are all equally in the mind?