HYL.  To exist is one thing, and to be perceived is another.

Phil.  I speak with regard to sensible things only.  And of these I ask, whether by their real existence you mean a subsistence exterior to the mind, and distinct from their being perceived?

HYL.  I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and without any relation to, their being perceived.

Phil.  Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must exist without the mind?

HYL.  It must.

Phil.  Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally compatible to all degrees of heat, which we perceive; or is there any reason why we should attribute it to some, and deny it to others?  And if there be, pray let me know that reason.

HYL.  Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we may be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it.

Phil.  What! the greatest as well as the least?

HYL. I tell you, the reason is plainly the same in respect of both.  They are both perceived by sense; nay, the greater degree of heat is more sensibly perceived; and consequently, if there is any difference, we are more certain of its real existence than we can be of the reality of a lesser degree.

Phil.  But is not the most vehement and intense degree of heat a very great pain?

HYL.  No one can deny it.

Phil.  And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or pleasure?

HYL.  No, certainly.

Phil.  Is your material substance a senseless being, or a being endowed with sense and perception?

HYL.  It is senseless without doubt.

Phil.  It cannot therefore be the subject of pain?

HYL.  By no means.

Phil.  Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by sense, since you acknowledge this to be no small pain?

HYL.  I grant it.

Phil.  What shall we say then of your external object; is it a material
Substance, or no?

HYL.  It is a material substance with the sensible qualities inhering in it.

Phil.  How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own it cannot in a material substance?  I desire you would clear this point.

HYL.  Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding intense heat to be a pain.  It should seem rather, that pain is something distinct from heat, and the consequence or effect of it.

Phil.  Upon putting your hand near the fire, do you perceive one simple uniform sensation, or two distinct sensations?

HYL.  But one simple sensation.

Phil.  Is not the heat immediately perceived?

HYL.  It is.

Phil.  And the pain?

HYL.  True.

Phil.  Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived at the same time, and the fire affects you only with one simple or uncompounded idea, it follows that this same simple idea is both the intense heat immediately perceived, and the pain; and, consequently, that the intense heat immediately perceived is nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain.