Phil.  But, are you not sensible, Hylas, that two things must concur to take away all scruple, and work a plenary assent in the mind?  Let a visible object be set in never so clear a light, yet, if there is any imperfection in the sight, or if the eye is not directed towards it, it will not be distinctly seen.  And though a demonstration be never so well grounded and fairly proposed, yet, if there is withal a stain of prejudice, or a wrong bias on the understanding, can it be expected on a sudden to perceive clearly, and adhere firmly to the truth?  No; there is need of time and pains:  the attention must be awakened and detained by a frequent repetition of the same thing placed oft in the same, oft in different lights.  I have said it already, and find I must still repeat and inculcate, that it is an unaccountable licence you take, in pretending to maintain you know not what, for you know not what reason, to you know not what purpose.  Can this be paralleled in any art or science, any sect or profession of men?  Or is there anything so barefacedly groundless and unreasonable to be met with even in the lowest of common conversation?  But, perhaps you will still say, Matter may exist; though at the same time you neither know what is meant by matter, or by its existence.  This indeed is surprising, and the more so because it is altogether voluntary and of your own head, you not being led to it by any one reason; for I challenge you to shew me that thing in nature which needs Matter to explain or account for it.

HYL.  The reality of things cannot be maintained without supposing the existence of Matter.  And is not this, think you, a good reason why I should be earnest in its defence?

Phil.  The reality of things!  What things? sensible or intelligible?

HYL.  Sensible things.

Phil.  My glove for example?

HYL.  That, or any other thing perceived by the senses.

Phil.  But to fix on some particular thing.  Is it not a sufficient evidence to me of the existence of this glove, that I see it, and feel it, and wear it?  Or, if this will not do, how is it possible I should be assured of the reality of this thing, which I actually see in this place, by supposing that some unknown thing, which I never did or can see, exists after an unknown manner, in an unknown place, or in no place at all?  How can the supposed reality of that which is intangible be a proof that anything tangible really exists?  Or, of that which is invisible, that any visible thing, or, in general of anything which is imperceptible, that a perceptible exists?  Do but explain this and I shall think nothing too hard for you.

HYL.  Upon the whole, I am content to own the existence of matter is highly improbable; but the direct and absolute impossibility of it does not appear to me.

Phil.  But granting Matter to be possible, yet, upon that account merely, it can have no more claim to existence than a golden mountain, or a centaur.