Phil.  But what is there positive in your abstracted notion of its existence?

HYL.  Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have any positive notion or meaning at all.  I tell you again, I am not ashamed to own my ignorance.  I know not what is meant by its existence, or how it exists.

Phil.  Continue, good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous part, and tell me sincerely whether you can frame a distinct idea of Entity in general, prescinded from and exclusive of all thinking and corporeal beings, all particular things whatsoever.

HYL.  Hold, let me think a little—­I profess, Philonous, I do not find that I can.  At first glance, methought I had some dilute and airy notion of Pure Entity in abstract; but, upon closer attention, it hath quite vanished out of sight.  The more I think on it, the more am I confirmed in my prudent resolution of giving none but negative answers, and not pretending to the least degree of any positive knowledge or conception of Matter, its where, its how, its entity, or anything belonging to it.

Phil.  When, therefore, you speak of the existence of Matter, you have not any notion in your mind?

HYL.  None at all.

Phil.  Pray tell me if the case stands not thus—­At first, from a belief of material substance, you would have it that the immediate objects existed without the mind; then that they are archetypes; then causes; next instruments; then occasions:  lastly something in general, which being interpreted proves nothing.  So Matter comes to nothing.  What think you, Hylas, is not this a fair summary of your whole proceeding?

HYL.  Be that as it will, yet I still insist upon it, that our not being able to conceive a thing is no argument against its existence.

Phil.  That from a cause, effect, operation, sign, or other circumstance, there may reasonably be inferred the existence of a thing not immediately perceived; and that it were absurd for any man to argue against the existence of that thing, from his having no direct and positive notion of it, I freely own.  But, where there is nothing of all this; where neither reason nor revelation induces us to believe the existence of a thing; where we have not even a relative notion of it; where an abstraction is made from perceiving and being perceived, from Spirit and idea:  lastly, where there is not so much as the most inadequate or faint idea pretended to—­I will not indeed thence conclude against the reality of any notion, or existence of anything; but my inference shall be, that you mean nothing at all; that you employ words to no manner of purpose, without any design or signification whatsoever.  And I leave it to you to consider how mere jargon should be treated.

HYL.  To deal frankly with you, Philonous, your arguments seem in themselves unanswerable; but they have not so great an effect on me as to produce that entire conviction, that hearty acquiescence, which attends demonstration.  I find myself relapsing into an obscure surmise of I know not what, matter.