HYL.  I think I have already offered all I had to say on those heads.  I am at a loss what more to urge.

Phil.  And yet you are loath to part with your old prejudice.  But, to make you quit it more easily, I desire that, beside what has been hitherto suggested, you will farther consider whether, upon. supposition that Matter exists, you can possibly conceive how you should be affected by it.  Or, supposing it did not exist, whether it be not evident you might for all that be affected with the same ideas you now are, and consequently have the very same reasons to believe its existence that you now can have.

HYL.  I acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all things just as we do now, though there was no Matter in the world; neither can I conceive, if there be Matter, how it should produce’ any idea in our minds.  And, I do farther grant you have entirely satisfied me that it is impossible there should be such a thing as matter in any of the foregoing acceptations.  But still I cannot help supposing that there is matter in some sense or other.  What that is I do not indeed pretend to determine.

Phil.  I do not expect you should define exactly the nature of that unknown being.  Only be pleased to tell me whether it is a Substance; and if so, whether you can suppose a Substance without accidents; or, in case you suppose it to have accidents or qualities, I desire you will let me know what those qualities are, at least what is meant by Matter’s supporting them?

HYL.  We have already argued on those points.  I have no more to say to them.  But, to prevent any farther questions, let me tell you I at present understand by matter neither substance nor accident, thinking nor extended being, neither cause, instrument, nor occasion, but Something entirely unknown, distinct from all these.

Phil.  It seems then you include in your present notion of Matter nothing but the general abstract idea of entity.

HYL.  Nothing else; save only that I super-add to this general idea the negation of all those particular things, qualities, or ideas, that I perceive, imagine, or in anywise apprehend.

Phil.  Pray where do you suppose this unknown Matter to exist?

HYL.  Oh Philonous! now you think you have entangled me; for, if I say it exists in place, then you will infer that it exists in the mind, since it is agreed that place or extension exists only in the mind.  But I am not ashamed to own my ignorance.  I know not where it exists; only I am sure it exists not in place.  There is a negative answer for you.  And you must expect no other to all the questions you put for the future about Matter.

Phil.  Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased to inform me after what manner you suppose it to exist, or what you mean by its existence?

HYL.  It neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives nor is perceived.