HYL.  I do not sufficiently understand you.

Phil.  In reading a book, what I immediately perceive are the letters; but mediately, or by means of these, are suggested to my mind the notions of God, virtue, truth, &c.  Now, that the letters are truly sensible things, or perceived by sense, there is no doubt:  but I would know whether you take the things suggested by them to be so too.

HYL.  No, certainly:  it were absurd to think god or virtue sensible things; though they may be signified and suggested to the mind by sensible marks, with which they have an arbitrary connexion.

Phil.  It seems then, that by sensible things you mean those only which can be perceived immediately by sense?

HYL.  Right.

Phil.  Doth it not follow from this, that though I see one part of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason doth thence evidently conclude there must be some cause of that diversity of colours, yet that cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing, or perceived by the sense of seeing?

HYL.  It doth.

Phil.  In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, yet I cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds?

HYL.  You cannot.

Phil.  And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot and heavy, I cannot say, with any truth or propriety, that I feel the cause of its heat or weight?

HYL.  To prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell you once for all, that by sensible things I mean those only which are perceived by sense; and that in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not perceive immediately:  for they make no inferences.  The deducing therefore of causes or occasions from effects and appearances, which alone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason.

Phil.  This point then is agreed between us—­That sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense.  You will farther inform me, whether we immediately perceive by sight anything beside light, and colours, and figures; or by hearing, anything but sounds; by the palate, anything beside tastes; by the smell, beside odours; or by the touch, more than tangible qualities.

HYL.  We do not.

Phil.  It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible?

HYL.  I grant it.

Phil.  Sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities?

HYL.  Nothing else.

Phil.  Heat then is a sensible thing?

HYL.  Certainly.

Phil.  Doth the reality of sensible things consist in being perceived? or, is it something distinct from their being perceived, and that bears no relation to the mind?