Phil.  But what if it should prove that there is something, even in the most general notion of instrument, as taken in a distinct sense from cause, which makes the use of it inconsistent with the Divine attributes?

HYL.  Make that appear and I shall give up the point.

Phil.  What mean you by the general nature or notion of instrument?

HYL.  That which is common to all particular instruments composeth the general notion.

Phil.  Is it not common to all instruments, that they are applied to the doing those things only which cannot be performed by the mere act of our wills?  Thus, for instance, I never use an instrument to move my finger, because it is done by a volition.  But I should use one if I were to remove part of a rock, or tear up a tree by the roots.  Are you of the same mind?  Or, can you shew any example where an instrument is made use of in producing an effect immediately depending on the will of the agent?

HYL.  I own I cannot.

Phil.  How therefore can you suppose that an All-perfect Spirit, on whose Will all things have an absolute and immediate dependence, should need an instrument in his operations, or, not needing it, make use of it?  Thus it seems to me that you are obliged to own the use of a lifeless inactive instrument to be incompatible with the infinite perfection of God; that is, by your own confession, to give up the point.

HYL.  It doth not readily occur what I can answer you.

Phil.  But, methinks you should be ready to own the truth, when it has been fairly proved to you.  We indeed, who are beings of finite powers, are forced to make use of instruments.  And the use of an instrument sheweth the agent to be limited by rules of another’s prescription, and that he cannot obtain his end but in such a way, and by such conditions.  Whence it seems a clear consequence, that the supreme unlimited agent useth no tool or instrument at all.  The will of an Omnipotent Spirit is no sooner exerted than executed, without the application of means; which, if they are employed by inferior agents, it is not upon account of any real efficacy that is in them, or necessary aptitude to produce any effect, but merely in compliance with the laws of nature, or those conditions prescribed to them by the First Cause, who is Himself above all limitation or prescription whatsoever.

HYL.  I will no longer maintain that Matter is an instrument.  However, I would not be understood to give up its existence neither; since, notwithstanding what hath been said, it may still be an occasion.

Phil.  How many shapes is your Matter to take?  Or, how often must it be proved not to exist, before you are content to part with it?  But, to say no more of this (though by all the laws of disputation I may justly blame you for so frequently changing the signification of the principal term)—­I would fain know what you mean by affirming that matter is an occasion, having already denied it to be a cause.  And, when you have shewn in what sense you understand occasion, pray, in the next place, be pleased to shew me what reason induceth you to believe there is such an occasion of our ideas?