Phil.  And are sensible qualities anything else but ideas?

HYL.  How often have I acknowledged that they are not.

Phil.  But is not motion a sensible quality?

HYL.  It is.

Phil.  Consequently it is no action?

HYL.  I agree with you.  And indeed it is very plain that when I stir my finger, it remains passive; but my will which produced the motion is active.

Phil.  Now, I desire to know, in the first place, whether, motion being allowed to be no action, you can conceive any action besides volition:  and, in the second place, whether to say something and conceive nothing be not to talk nonsense:  and, lastly, whether, having considered the premises, you do not perceive that to suppose any efficient or active Cause of our ideas, other than spirit, is highly absurd and unreasonable?

HYL.  I give up the point entirely.  But, though Matter may not be a cause, yet what hinders its being an instrument, subservient to the supreme Agent in the production of our ideas?

Phil.  An instrument say you; pray what may be the figure, springs, wheels, and motions, of that instrument?

HYL.  Those I pretend to determine nothing of, both the substance and its qualities being entirely unknown to me.

Phil.  What?  You are then of opinion it is made up of unknown parts, that it hath unknown motions, and an unknown shape?

HYL.  I do not believe that it hath any figure or motion at all, being already convinced, that no sensible qualities can exist in an unperceiving substance.

Phil.  But what notion is it possible to frame of an instrument void of all sensible qualities, even extension itself?

HYL.  I do not pretend to have any notion of it.

Phil.  And what reason have you to think this unknown, this inconceivable Somewhat doth exist?  Is it that you imagine God cannot act as well without it; or that you find by experience the use of some such thing, when you form ideas in your own mind?

HYL.  You are always teasing me for reasons of my belief.  Pray what reasons have you not to believe it?

Phil.  It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the existence of anything, if I see no reason for believing it.  But, not to insist on reasons for believing, you will not so much as let me know what it is you would have me believe; since you say you have no manner of notion of it.  After all, let me entreat you to consider whether it be like a philosopher, or even like a man of common sense, to pretend to believe you know not what and you know not why.

HYL.  Hold, Philonous.  When I tell you Matter is an instrument, I do not mean altogether nothing.  It is true I know not the particular kind of instrument; but, however, I have some notion of instrument in general, which I apply to it.