HYL.  Without doubt.

Phil.  But, on the other hand, it is very conceivable that they should exist in and be produced by a spirit; since this is no more than I daily experience in myself, inasmuch as I perceive numberless ideas; and, by an act of my will, can form a great variety of them, and raise them up in my imagination:  though, it must be confessed, these creatures of the fancy are not altogether so distinct, so strong, vivid, and permanent, as those perceived by my senses—­which latter are called red things.  From all which I conclude, there is A mind which affects me every Moment with all the sensible impressions I perceive.  And, from the variety, order, and manner of these, I conclude the author of them to be wise, powerful, and good, beyond comprehension.  Mark it well; I do not say, I see things by perceiving that which represents them in the intelligible Substance of God.  This I do not understand; but I say, the things by me perceived are known by the understanding, and produced by the will of an infinite Spirit.  And is not all this most plain and evident?  Is there any more in it than what a little observation in our own minds, and that which passeth in them, not only enables us to conceive, but also obliges us to acknowledge.

HYL.  I think I understand you very clearly; and own the proof you give of a Deity seems no less evident than it is surprising.  But, allowing that God is the supreme and universal Cause of an things, yet, may there not be still a Third Nature besides Spirits and Ideas?  May we not admit a subordinate and limited cause of our ideas?  In a word, may there not for all that be matter?

Phil.  How often must I inculcate the same thing?  You allow the things immediately perceived by sense to exist nowhere without the mind; but there is nothing perceived by sense which is not perceived immediately:  therefore there is nothing sensible that exists without the mind.  The Matter, therefore, which you still insist on is something intelligible, I suppose; something that may be discovered by reason, and not by sense.

HYL.  You are in the right.

Phil.  Pray let me know what reasoning your belief of Matter is grounded on; and what this Matter is, in your present sense of it.

HYL.  I find myself affected with various ideas, whereof I know I am not the cause; neither are they the cause of themselves, or of one another, or capable of subsisting by themselves, as being altogether inactive, fleeting, dependent beings.  They have therefore some cause distinct from me and them:  of which I pretend to know no more than that it is the cause of my ideas.  And this thing, whatever it be, I call Matter.