Phil.  I do not understand how our ideas, which are things altogether passive and inert, can be the essence, or any part (or like any part) of the essence or substance of God, who is an impassive, indivisible, pure, active being.  Many more difficulties and objections there are which occur at first view against this hypothesis; but I shall only add that it is liable to all the absurdities of the common hypothesis, in making a created world exist otherwise than in the mind of a Spirit.  Besides all which it hath this peculiar to itself; that it makes that material world serve to no purpose.  And, if it pass for a good argument against other hypotheses in the sciences, that they suppose Nature, or the Divine wisdom, to make something in vain, or do that by tedious roundabout methods which might have been performed in a much more easy and compendious way, what shall we think of that hypothesis which supposes the whole world made in vain?

HYL.  But what say you?  Are not you too of opinion that we see all things in God?  If I mistake not, what you advance comes near it.

Phil.  Few men think; yet all have opinions.  Hence men’s opinions are superficial and confused.  It is nothing strange that tenets which in themselves are ever so different, should nevertheless be confounded with each other, by those who do not consider them attentively.  I shall not therefore be surprised if some men imagine that I run into the enthusiasm of Malebranche; though in truth I am very remote from it.  He builds on the most abstract general ideas, which I entirely disclaim.  He asserts an absolute external world, which I deny.  He maintains that we are deceived by our senses, and, know not the real natures or the true forms and figures of extended beings; of all which I hold the direct contrary.  So that upon the whole there are no Principles more fundamentally opposite than his and mine.  It must be owned that I entirely agree with what the holy Scripture saith, “That in God we live and move and have our being.”  But that we see things in His essence, after the manner above set forth, I am far from believing.  Take here in brief my meaning:—­It is evident that the things I perceive are my own ideas, and that no idea can exist unless it be in a mind:  nor is it less plain that these ideas or things by me perceived, either themselves or their archetypes, exist independently of my mind, since I know myself not to be their author, it being out of my power to determine at pleasure what particular ideas I shall be affected with upon opening my eyes or ears:  they must therefore exist in some other Mind, whose Will it is they should be exhibited to me.  The things, I say, immediately perceived are ideas or sensations, call them which you will.  But how can any idea or sensation exist in, or be produced by, anything but a mind or spirit?  This indeed is inconceivable.  And to assert that which is inconceivable is to talk nonsense:  is it not?