HYL.  With all my heart.  Since you are for raising disputes about the plainest things in nature, I am content for once to hear what you have to say.

Phil.  Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a sceptic?

HYL.  I mean what all men mean—­one that doubts of everything.

Phil.  He then who entertains no doubts concerning some particular point, with regard to that point cannot be thought a sceptic.

HYL.  I agree with you.

Phil.  Whether doth doubting consist in embracing the affirmative or negative side of a question?

HYL.  In neither; for whoever understands English cannot but know that
doubting signifies a suspense between both.

Phil.  He then that denies any point, can no more be said to doubt of it, than he who affirmeth it with the same degree of assurance.

HYL.  True.

Phil.  And, consequently, for such his denial is no more to be esteemed a sceptic than the other.

HYL.  I acknowledge it.

Phil.  How cometh it to pass then, Hylas, that you pronounce me A sceptic, because I deny what you affirm, to wit, the existence of Matter?  Since, for aught you can tell, I am as peremptory in my denial, as you in your affirmation.

HYL.  Hold, Philonous, I have been a little out in my definition; but every false step a man makes in discourse is not to be insisted on.  I said indeed that a sceptic was one who doubted of everything; but I should have added, or who denies the reality and truth of things.

Phil.  What things?  Do you mean the principles and theorems of sciences?  But these you know are universal intellectual notions, and consequently independent of Matter.  The denial therefore of this doth not imply the denying them.

HYL.  I grant it.  But are there no other things?  What think you of distrusting the senses, of denying the real existence of sensible things, or pretending to know nothing of them.  Is not this sufficient to denominate a man a sceptic?

Phil.  Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that denies the reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest ignorance of them; since, if I take you rightly, he is to be esteemed the greatest sceptic?

HYL.  That is what I desire.

Phil.  What mean you by Sensible Things?

HYL.  Those things which are perceived by the senses.  Can you imagine that I mean anything else?

Phil.  Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to apprehend your notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry.  Suffer me then to ask you this farther question.  Are those things only perceived by the senses which are perceived immediately?  Or, may those things properly be said to be sensible which are perceived mediately, or not without the intervention of others?