Phil.  Are those external objects perceived by sense or by some other faculty?

HYL.  They are perceived by sense.

Phil.  Howl Is there any thing perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived?

HYL.  Yes, Philonous, in some sort there is.  For example, when I look on a picture or statue of Julius Caesar, I may be said after a manner to perceive him (though not immediately) by my senses.

Phil.  It seems then you will have our ideas, which alone are immediately perceived, to be pictures of external things:  and that these also are perceived by sense, inasmuch as they have a conformity or resemblance to our ideas?

HYL.  That is my meaning.

Phil.  And, in the same way that Julius Caesar, in himself invisible, is nevertheless perceived by sight; real things, in themselves imperceptible, are perceived by sense.

HYL.  In the very same.

Phil.  Tell me, Hylas, when you behold the picture of Julius Caesar, do you see with your eyes any more than some colours and figures, with a certain symmetry and composition of the whole?

HYL.  Nothing else.

Phil.  And would not a man who had never known anything of Julius Caesar see as much?

HYL.  He would.

Phil.  Consequently he hath his sight, and the use of it, in as perfect a degree as you?

HYL.  I agree with you.

Phil.  Whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed to the Roman emperor, and his are not?  This cannot proceed from the sensations or ideas of sense by you then perceived; since you acknowledge you have no advantage over him in that respect.  It should seem therefore to proceed from reason and memory:  should it not?

HYL.  It should.

Phil.  Consequently, it will not follow from that instance that anything is perceived by sense which is not, immediately perceived.  Though I grant we may, in one acceptation, be said to perceive sensible things mediately by sense:  that is, when, from a frequently perceived connexion, the immediate perception of ideas by one sense suggests to the mind others, perhaps belonging to another sense, which are wont to be connected with them.  For instance, when I hear a coach drive along the streets, immediately I perceive only the sound; but, from the experience I have had that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the coach.  It is nevertheless evident that, in truth and strictness, nothing can be heard but sound; and the coach is not then properly perceived by sense, but suggested from experience.  So likewise when we are said to see a red-hot bar of iron; the solidity and heat of the iron are not the objects of sight, but suggested to the imagination by the colour and figure which are properly perceived by that sense.  In short, those things alone are actually and strictly perceived