Phil.  It seems then you have no idea at all, neither relative nor positive, of Matter; you know neither what it is in itself, nor what relation it bears to accidents?

HYL.  I acknowledge it.

Phil.  And yet you asserted that you could not conceive how qualities or accidents should really exist, without conceiving at the same time a material support of them?

HYL.  I did.

Phil.  That is to say, when you conceive the real existence of qualities, you do withal conceive Something which you cannot conceive?

HYL.  It was wrong, I own.  But still I fear there is some fallacy or other.  Pray what think you of this?  It is just come into my head that the ground of all our mistake lies in your treating of each quality by itself.  Now, I grant that each quality cannot singly subsist without the mind.  Colour cannot without extension, neither can figure without some other sensible quality.  But, as the several qualities united or blended together form entire sensible things, nothing hinders why such things may not be supposed to exist without the mind.

Phil.  Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very bad memory.  Though indeed we went through all the qualities by name one after another, yet my arguments or rather your concessions, nowhere tended to prove that the Secondary Qualities did not subsist each alone by itself; but, that they were not at all without the mind.  Indeed, in treating of figure and motion we concluded they could not exist without the mind, because it was impossible even in thought to separate them from all secondary qualities, so as to conceive them existing by themselves.  But then this was not the only argument made use of upon that occasion.  But (to pass by all that hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it so) I am content to put the whole upon this issue.  If you can conceive it possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually to be so.

HYL.  If it comes to that the point will soon be decided.  What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and unperceived by, any mind whatsoever?  I do at this present time conceive them existing after that manner.

Phil.  How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen?

HYL.  No, that were a contradiction.

Phil.  Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiving a thing which is UNCONCEIVED?

HYL.  It is.

Phil.  The, tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by you?

HYL.  How should it be otherwise?

Phil.  And what is conceived is surely in the mind?

HYL.  Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind.