Phil.  What tulip do you speak of?  Is it that which you see?

HYL.  The same.

Phil.  And what do you see beside colour, figure, and extension?

HYL.  Nothing.

Phil.  What you would say then is that the red and yellow are coexistent with the extension; is it not?

HYL.  That is not all; I would say they have a real existence without the mind, in some unthinking substance.

Phil.  That the colours are really in the tulip which I see is manifest.  Neither can it be denied that this tulip may exist independent of your mind or mine; but, that any immediate object of the senses,—­that is, any idea, or combination of ideas—­should exist in an unthinking substance, or exterior to all minds, is in itself an evident contradiction.  Nor can I imagine how this follows from what you said just now, to wit, that the red and yellow were on the tulip you saw, since you do not pretend to see that unthinking substance.

HYL.  You have an artful way, Philonous, of diverting our inquiry from the subject.

Phil.  I see you have no mind to be pressed that way.  To return then to your distinction between sensation and object; if I take you right, you distinguish in every perception two things, the one an action of the mind, the other not.

HYL.  True.

Phil.  And this action cannot exist in, or belong to, any unthinking thing; but, whatever beside is implied in a perception may?

HYL.  That is my meaning.

Phil.  So that if there was a perception without any act of the mind, it were possible such a perception should exist in an unthinking substance?

HYL.  I grant it.  But it is impossible there should be such a perception.

Phil.  When is the mind said to be active?

HYL.  When it produces, puts an end to, or changes, anything.

Phil.  Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change anything, but by an act of the will?

HYL.  It cannot.

Phil.  The mind therefore is to be accounted active in its perceptions so far forth as volition is included in them?

HYL.  It is.

Phil.  In plucking this flower I am active; because I do it by the motion of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition; so likewise in applying it to my nose.  But is either of these smelling?

HYL.  No.

Phil.  I act too in drawing the air through my nose; because my breathing so rather than otherwise is the effect of my volition.  But neither can this be called smelling:  for, if it were, I should smell every time I breathed in that manner?

HYL.  True.

Phil.  Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this?

HYL.  It is.

Phil.  But I do not find my will concerned any farther.  Whatever more there is—­as that I perceive such a particular smell, or any smell at all—­this is independent of my will, and therein I am altogether passive.  Do you find it otherwise with you, Hylas?