(1.) You cannot either give me any reason why you believe it exists [Vide sect. lviii.], Or (2.) Assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist [Vide sect. lx.].  I say, the bare possibility of your opinions being true shall pass for an argument that it is so. [Note:  i.e. although your argument be deficient in the two requisites of an hypothesis.—­Ed.]

23.  But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them.  I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them?  But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while?  This therefore is nothing to the purpose; it only shows you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind:  but it does not show that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind.  To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing UNCONCEIVED or unthought of, which is A manifest repugnancy.  When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas.  But the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself.  A little attention will discover to any one the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of material substance.

24.  The absolute existence of unthinking things are words without A meaning.—­It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our thoughts, to know whether it is possible for us to understand what is meant by the absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind.  To me it is evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all.  And to convince others of this, I know no readier or fairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own thoughts; and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for the conviction.  It is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that the absolute existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning, or which include a contradiction.  This is what I repeat and inculcate, and earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader.