20.  Some of the ends of language.—­Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed.  There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some particular disposition—­to which the former is in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I think does not unfrequently happen in the familiar use of language.  I entreat the reader to reflect with himself, and see if it doth not often happen, either in hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred, admiration, disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain words, without any ideas coming between.  At first, indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas that were fitting to produce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be found that, when language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the sounds or sight of the characters is oft immediately attended with those passions which at first were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas that are now quite omitted.  May we not, for example, be affected with the promise of a good thing, though we have not an idea of what it is?  Or is not the being threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we think not of any particular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to ourselves an idea of danger in abstract?  If any one shall join ever so little reflexion of his own to what has been said, I believe that it will evidently appear to him that general names are often used in the propriety of language without the speaker’s designing them for marks of ideas in his own, which he would have them raise in the mind of the hearer.  Even proper names themselves do not seem always spoken with a design to bring into our view the ideas of those individuals that are supposed to be marked by them.  For example, when a schoolman tells me “Aristotle has said it,” all I conceive he means by it is to dispose me to embrace his opinion with the deference and submission which custom has annexed to that name.  And this effect is often so instantly produced in the minds of those who are accustomed to resign their judgment to authority of that philosopher, as it is impossible any idea either of his person, writings, or reputation should go before [Note.].  Innumerable examples of this kind may be given, but why should I insist on those things which every one’s experience will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him?

[Note:  “So close and immediate a connection may custom establish betwixt the very word Aristotle, and the motions of assent and reverence in the minds of some men.”—­Edit 1710.]