feeling or sentiment; in something, that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles, of which we are not masters.  When we are convinced of any matter of fact, we do nothing but conceive it, along with a certain feeling, different from what attends the mere reveries of the imagination.  And when we express our incredulity concerning any fact, we mean, that the arguments for the fact produce not that feeling.  Did not the belief consist in a sentiment different from our mere conception, whatever objects were presented by the wildest imagination, would be on an equal footing with the most established truths founded on history and experience.  There is nothing but the feeling, or sentiment, to distinguish the one from the other.

This, therefore, being regarded as an undoubted truth, that belief is nothing but a peculiar feeling, different from the simple conception, the next question, that naturally occurs, is, what is the nature of this feeling, or sentiment, and whether it be analogous to any other sentiment of the human mind?  This question is important.  For if it be not analogous to any other sentiment, we must despair of explaining its causes, and must consider it as an original principle of the human mind.  If it be analogous, we may hope to explain its causes from analogy, and trace it up to more general principles.  Now that there is a greater firmness and solidity in the conceptions, which are the objects of conviction and assurance, than in the loose and indolent reveries of a castle-builder, every one will readily own.  They strike upon us with more force; they are more present to us; the mind has a firmer hold of them, and is more actuated and moved by them.  It acquiesces in them; and, in a manner, fixes and reposes itself on them.  In short, they approach nearer to the impressions, which are immediately present to us; and are therefore analogous to many other operations of the mind.

There is not, in my opinion, any possibility of evading this conclusion, but by asserting, that belief, beside the simple conception, consists in some impression or feeling, distinguishable from the conception.  It does not modify the conception, and render it more present and intense:  It is only annexed to it, after the same manner that will and desire are annexed to particular conceptions of good and pleasure.  But the following considerations will, I hope, be sufficient to remove this hypothesis.  First, It is directly contrary to experience, and our immediate consciousness.  All men have ever allowed reasoning to be merely an operation of our thoughts or ideas; and however those ideas may be varied to the feeling, there is nothing ever enters into our conclusions but ideas, or our fainter conceptions.  For instance; I hear at present a person’s voice, whom I am acquainted with; and this sound comes from the next room.  This impression of my senses immediately conveys my thoughts to the person, along with all