to arise in me:  His company is a satisfaction to me; and before I have any farther acquaintance with him, I would rather do him a service than another, whose character is in every other respect equal, but is deficient in that particular.  In this case, the qualities that please me are all considered as useful to the person, and as having a tendency to promote his interest and satisfaction.  They are only regarded as means to an end, and please me in proportion to their fitness for that end.  The end, therefore, must be agreeable to me.  But what makes the end agreeable?  The person is a stranger:  I am no way interested in him, nor lie under any obligation to him:  His happiness concerns not me, farther than the happiness of every human, and indeed of every sensible creature:  That is, it affects me only by sympathy.  From that principle, whenever I discover his happiness and good, whether in its causes or effects, I enter so deeply into it, that it gives me a sensible emotion.  The appearance of qualities, that have a tendency to promote it, have an agreeable effect upon my imagination, and command my love and esteem.

This theory may serve to explain, why the same qualities, in all cases, produce both pride and love, humility and hatred; and the same man is always virtuous or vicious, accomplished or despicable to others, who is so to himself.  A person, in whom we discover any passion or habit, which originally is only incommodious to himself, becomes always disagreeable to us, merely on its account; as on the other hand, one whose character is only dangerous and disagreeable to others, can never be satisfied with himself, as long as he is sensible of that disadvantage.  Nor is this observable only with regard to characters and manners, but may be remarked even in the most minute circumstances.  A violent cough in another gives us uneasiness; though in itself it does not in the least affect us.  A man will be mortified, if you tell him he has a stinking breath; though it is evidently no annoyance to himself.  Our fancy easily changes its situation; and either surveying ourselves as we appear to others, or considering others as they feel themselves, we enter, by that means, into sentiments, which no way belong to us, and in which nothing but sympathy is able to interest us.  And this sympathy we sometimes carry so far, as even to be displeased with a quality commodious to us, merely because it displeases others, and makes us disagreeable in their eyes; though perhaps we never can have any interest in rendering ourselves agreeable to them.

There have been many systems of morality advanced by philosophers in all ages; but if they are strictly examined, they may be reduced to two, which alone merit our attention.  Moral good and evil are certainly distinguished by our sentiments, not by reason:  But these sentiments may arise either from the mere species or appearance of characters and passions, or from reflections on their tendency to the happiness