Quod Si FRUMENTUM TITII FRUMENTO TUO MISTUM FUERIT:  SIQUIDEM ex VOLUNTATE
VESTRA, commune est:  QUIA SINGULA corpora, id est, SINGULA Grana, QUAE
CUJUSQUE pro PRIA FUERUNT, ex CONSENSU VESTRO COMMUNICATA sunt.  Quod Si
CASU id MISTUM FUERIT, VEL Titius id MISCUERIT sine Tua VOLUNT ate, non
VIDETUR id commune ESSE; quia SINGULA corpora in SUA SUBSTANTIA Durant. 
Sed NEC MAGIS ISTIS CASIBUS commune sit FRUMENTUM Quam GREX INTELLIGITUR
ESSE corn Munis, Si Pecora TITII TUIS PECORIBUS MISTA FUERINT.  Sed Si ab
ALTERUTRO VESTRUM TOTUM id FRUMENTUM RETINEATUR, in REM quidem ACTIO pro
MODO FRUMENTI CUJUSQUE corn Petit.  ARBITRIO AUTEM JUDICIS, UT ipse
AESTIMET Quale CUJUSQUE FRUMENTUM FUERIT.  Inst.  Lib.  IL Tit. i.  Sect 28.

(In the case that your grain was mixed with that of Titius, if it was done voluntarily on the part of both of you, it is common property, inasmuch as the individual items, i.e., the single grains, which were the peculiar property of either of you, were combined with your joint consent.  If, however, the mixture was accidental, or if Titius mixed it without your consent, it does not appear that it is common property, Inasmuch as the several components retain their original identity.  Rather, in circumstances of this sort the grain does not become common property, any more than a herd of cattle is regarded as common property, If Titius beasts should have become mixed up with yours.

However, if all of the aforesaid corn is kept by either of you, this gives rise to a suit to determine the ownership of property, in respect of the amount of corn belonging to each.  It is in the discretion of the judge to determine which is the corn belonging to either party.]

Where the properties of two persons are united after such a manner as neither to admit of division nor separation, as when one builds a house on another’s ground, in that case, the whole must belong to one of the proprietors:  And here I assert, that it naturally is conceived to belong to the proprietor of the most considerable part.  For however the compound object may have a relation to two different persons, and carry our view at once to both of them, yet as the most considerable part principally engages our attention, and by the strict union draws the inferior along it; for this reason, the whole bears a relation to the proprietor of that part, and is regarded as his property.  The only difficulty is, what we shall be pleased to call the most considerable part, and most attractive to the imagination.