A Treatise of Human Nature eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 785 pages of information about A Treatise of Human Nature.

A Treatise of Human Nature eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 785 pages of information about A Treatise of Human Nature.
of the small one; since the transition is in that case very easy from the small object to the great one, and shoued connect them together in the closest manner.  But In fact the case is always found to be otherwise, The empire of Great Britain seems to draw along with it the dominion of the Orkneys, the Hebrides, the isle of Man, and the Isle of Wight; but the authority over those lesser islands does not naturally imply any title to Great Britain.  In short, a small object naturally follows a great one as its accession; but a great one Is never supposed to belong to the proprietor of a small one related to it, merely on account of that property and relation.  Yet in this latter case the transition of ideas is smoother from the proprietor to the small object, which is his property, and from the small object to the great one, than in the former case from the proprietor to the great object, and from the great one to the small.  It may therefore be thought, that these phaenomena are objections to the foregoing hypothesis, that the ascribing of property to accession is nothing but an affect of the relations of ideas, and of the smooth transition of the imagination.

It will be easy to solve this objection, if we consider the agility and unsteadiness of the imagination, with the different views, in which it is continually placing its objects.  When we attribute to a person a property in two objects, we do not always pass from the person to one object, and from that to the other related to it.  The objects being here to be considered as the property of the person, we are apt to join them together, and place them in the same light.  Suppose, therefore, a great and a small object to be related together; if a person be strongly related to the great object, he will likewise be strongly related to both the objects, considered together, because he Is related to the most considerable part.  On the contrary, if he be only related to the small object, he will not be strongly related to both, considered together, since his relation lies only with the most trivial part, which is not apt to strike us in any great degree, when we consider the whole.  And this Is the reason, why small objects become accessions to great ones, and not great to small.

It is the general opinion of philosophers and civilians, that the sea is incapable of becoming the property of any nation; and that because it is impossible to take possession of it, or form any such distinct relation with it, as may be the foundation of property.  Where this reason ceases, property immediately takes place.  Thus the most strenuous advocates for the liberty of the seas universally allow, that friths and hays naturally belong as an accession to the proprietors of the surrounding continent.  These have properly no more bond or union with the land, than the pacific ocean would have; but having an union in the fancy, and being at the same time inferior, they are of course regarded as an accession.

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A Treatise of Human Nature from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.