of society, and to the well-being of mankind, by modifying the general rule concerning the stability of possession.  And as property forms a relation betwixt a person and an object, it is natural to found it on some preceding relation; and as property Is nothing but a constant possession, secured by the laws of society, it is natural to add it to the present possession, which is a relation that resembles it.  For this also has its influence.  If it be natural to conjoin all sorts of relations, it is more so, to conjoin such relations as are resembling, and are related together.]

But we may observe, that though the rule of the assignment of property to the present possessor be natural, and by that means useful, yet its utility extends not beyond the first formation of society; nor would any thing be more pernicious, than the constant observance of it; by which restitution would be excluded, and every injustice would be authorized and rewarded.  We must, therefore, seek for some other circumstance, that may give rise to property after society is once established; and of this kind, I find four most considerable, viz.  Occupation, Prescription, Accession, and Succession.  We shall briefly examine each of these, beginning with Occupation.

The possession of all external goods is changeable and uncertain; which is one of the most considerable impediments to the establishment of society, and is the reason why, by universal agreement, express or tacite, men restrain themselves by what we now call the rules of justice and equity.  The misery of the condition, which precedes this restraint, is the cause why we submit to that remedy as quickly as possible; and this affords us an easy reason, why we annex the idea of property to the first possession, or to occupation.  Men are unwilling to leave property in suspense, even for the shortest time, or open the least door to violence and disorder.  To which we may add, that the first possession always engages the attention most; and did we neglect it, there would be no colour of reason for assigning property to any succeeding possession.

[Footnote 16.  Some philosophers account for the right of occupation, by saying, that every one has a property in his own labour; and when he joins that labour to any thing, it gives him the property of the whole:  But, 1.  There are several kinds of occupation, where we cannot be said to join our labour to the object we acquire:  As when we possess a meadow by grazing our cattle upon it. 2.  This accounts for the matter by means of accession; which is taking a needless circuit. 3.  We cannot be said to join our labour to any thing but in a figurative sense.  Properly speaking, we only make an alteration on it by our labour.  This forms a relation betwixt us and the object; and thence arises the property, according to the preceding principles.]