it virtuous, is to reason in a circle.  Before we can have such a regard, the action must be really virtuous; and this virtue must be derived from some virtuous motive:  And consequently the virtuous motive must be different from the regard to the virtue of the action.  A virtuous motive is requisite to render an action virtuous.  An action must be virtuous, before we can have a regard to its virtue.  Some virtuous motive, therefore, must be antecedent to that regard.

Nor is this merely a metaphysical subtilty; but enters into all our reasonings in common life, though perhaps we may not be able to place it in such distinct philosophical terms.  We blame a father for neglecting his child.  Why? because it shews a want of natural affection, which is the duty of every parent.  Were not natural affection a duty, the care of children coued not be a duty; and it were impossible we coued have the duty in our eye in the attention we give to our offspring.  In this case, therefore, all men suppose a motive to the action distinct from a sense of duty.

Here is a man, that does many benevolent actions; relieves the distressed, comforts the afflicted, and extends his bounty even to the greatest strangers.  No character can be more amiable and virtuous.  We regard these actions as proofs of the greatest humanity.  This humanity bestows a merit on the actions.  A regard to this merit is, therefore, a secondary consideration, and derived from the antecedent principle of humanity, which is meritorious and laudable.

In short, it may be established as an undoubted maxim, that no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality.

But may not the sense of morality or duty produce an action, without any other motive?  I answer, It may:  But this is no objection to the present doctrine.  When any virtuous motive or principle is common in human nature, a person, who feels his heart devoid of that motive, may hate himself upon that account, and may perform the action without the motive, from a certain sense of duty, in order to acquire by practice, that virtuous principle, or at least, to disguise to himself, as much as possible, his want of it.  A man that really feels no gratitude in his temper, is still pleased to perform grateful actions, and thinks he has, by that means, fulfilled his duty.  Actions are at first only considered as signs of motives:  But it is usual, in this case, as in all others, to fix our attention on the signs, and neglect, in some measure, the thing signifyed.  But though, on some occasions, a person may perform an action merely out of regard to its moral obligation, yet still this supposes in human nature some distinct principles, which are capable of producing the action, and whose moral beauty renders the action meritorious.