of cause and effect in human actions, that punishments
coued be inflicted compatible with justice and moral
equity; but also that it coued ever enter into the
thoughts of any reasonable being to inflict them.
The constant and universal object of hatred or anger
is a person or creature endowed with thought and consciousness;
and when any criminal or injurious actions excite
that passion, it is only by their relation to the
person or connexion with him. But according to
the doctrine of liberty or chance, this connexion
is reduced to nothing, nor are men more accountable
for those actions, which are designed and premeditated,
than for such as are the most casual and accidental.
Actions are by their very nature temporary and perishing;
and where they proceed not from some cause in the
characters and disposition of the person, who performed
them, they infix not themselves upon him, and can neither
redound to his honour, if good, nor infamy, if evil.
The action itself may be blameable; it may be contrary
to all the rules of morality and religion: But
the person is not responsible for it; and as it proceeded
from nothing in him, that is durable or constant,
and leaves nothing of that nature behind it, it is
impossible he can, upon its account, become the object
of punishment or vengeance. According to the
hypothesis of liberty, therefore, a man is as pure
and untainted, after having committed the most horrid
crimes, as at the first moment of his birth, nor is
his character any way concerned in his actions; since
they are not derived from it, and the wickedness of
the one can never be used as a proof of the depravity
of the other. It is only upon the principles of
necessity, that a person acquires any merit or demerit
from his actions, however the common opinion may incline
to the contrary.
But so inconsistent are men with themselves, that
though they often assert, that necessity utterly destroys
all merit and demerit either towards mankind or superior
powers, yet they continue still to reason upon these
very principles of necessity in all their judgments
concerning this matter. Men are not blamed for
such evil actions as they perform ignorantly and casually,
whatever may be their consequences. Why? but
because the causes of these actions are only momentary,
and terminate in them alone. Men are less blamed
for such evil actions, as they perform hastily and
unpremeditately, than for such as proceed from thought
and deliberation. For what reason? but because
a hasty temper, though a constant cause in the mind,
operates only by intervals, and infects not the whole
character. Again, repentance wipes off every crime,
especially if attended with an evident reformation
of life and manners. How is this to be accounted
for? But by asserting that actions render a person
criminal, merely as they are proofs of criminal passions
or principles in the mind; and when by any alteration
of these principles they cease to be just proofs,
they likewise cease to be criminal. But according
to the doctrine of liberty or chance they never were
just proofs, and consequently never were criminal.