of cause and effect in human actions, that punishments coued be inflicted compatible with justice and moral equity; but also that it coued ever enter into the thoughts of any reasonable being to inflict them.  The constant and universal object of hatred or anger is a person or creature endowed with thought and consciousness; and when any criminal or injurious actions excite that passion, it is only by their relation to the person or connexion with him.  But according to the doctrine of liberty or chance, this connexion is reduced to nothing, nor are men more accountable for those actions, which are designed and premeditated, than for such as are the most casual and accidental.  Actions are by their very nature temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in the characters and disposition of the person, who performed them, they infix not themselves upon him, and can neither redound to his honour, if good, nor infamy, if evil.  The action itself may be blameable; it may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion:  But the person is not responsible for it; and as it proceeded from nothing in him, that is durable or constant, and leaves nothing of that nature behind it, it is impossible he can, upon its account, become the object of punishment or vengeance.  According to the hypothesis of liberty, therefore, a man is as pure and untainted, after having committed the most horrid crimes, as at the first moment of his birth, nor is his character any way concerned in his actions; since they are not derived from it, and the wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof of the depravity of the other.  It is only upon the principles of necessity, that a person acquires any merit or demerit from his actions, however the common opinion may incline to the contrary.

But so inconsistent are men with themselves, that though they often assert, that necessity utterly destroys all merit and demerit either towards mankind or superior powers, yet they continue still to reason upon these very principles of necessity in all their judgments concerning this matter.  Men are not blamed for such evil actions as they perform ignorantly and casually, whatever may be their consequences.  Why? but because the causes of these actions are only momentary, and terminate in them alone.  Men are less blamed for such evil actions, as they perform hastily and unpremeditately, than for such as proceed from thought and deliberation.  For what reason? but because a hasty temper, though a constant cause in the mind, operates only by intervals, and infects not the whole character.  Again, repentance wipes off every crime, especially if attended with an evident reformation of life and manners.  How is this to be accounted for?  But by asserting that actions render a person criminal, merely as they are proofs of criminal passions or principles in the mind; and when by any alteration of these principles they cease to be just proofs, they likewise cease to be criminal.  But according to the doctrine of liberty or chance they never were just proofs, and consequently never were criminal.