Thus we have endeavoured to account for pity and malice.  Both these affections arise from the imagination, according to the light, in which it places its object.  When our fancy considers directly the sentiments of others, and enters deep into them, it makes us sensible of all the passions it surveys, but in a particular manner of grief or sorrow.  On the contrary, when we compare the sentiments of others to our own, we feel a sensation directly opposite to the original one, viz. a joy from the grief of others, and a grief from their joy.  But these are only the first foundations of the affections of pity and malice.  Other passions are afterwards confounded with them.  There is always a mixture of love or tenderness with pity, and of hatred or anger with malice.  But it must be confessed, that this mixture seems at first sight to be contradictory to my system.  For as pity is an uneasiness, and malice a joy, arising from the misery of others, pity should naturally, as in all other cases, produce hatred; and malice, love.  This contradiction I endeavour to reconcile, after the following manner.

In order to cause a transition of passions, there is required a double relation of impressions and ideas, nor is one relation sufficient to produce this effect.  But that we may understand the full force of this double relation, we must consider, that it is not the present sensation alone or momentary pain or pleasure, which determines the character of any passion, but the whole bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the end.  One impression may be related to another, not only when their sensations are resembling, as we have all along supposed in the preceding cases; but also when their im pulses or directions are similar and correspondent.  This cannot take place with regard to pride and humility; because these are only pure sensations, without any direction or tendency to action.  We are, therefore, to look for instances of this peculiar relation of impressions only in such affections, as are attended with a certain appetite or desire; such as those of love and hatred,

Benevolence or the appetite, which attends love, is a desire of the happiness of the person beloved, and an aversion to his misery; as anger or the appetite, which attends hatred, is a desire of the misery of the person hated, and an aversion to his happiness.  A desire, therefore, of the happiness of another, and aversion to his misery, are similar to benevolence; and a desire of his misery and aversion to his happiness are correspondent to anger.  Now pity is a desire of happiness to another, and aversion to his misery; as malice is the contrary appetite.  Pity, then, is related to benevolence; and malice to anger:  And as benevolence has been already found to be connected with love, by a natural and original quality, and anger with hatred; it is by this chain the passions of pity and malice are connected with love and hatred.