lies under affliction, feels the reflected uneasiness from his friend more sensibly by a comparison with the original pleasure, which he himself enjoys.  This contrast, indeed, ought also to inliven the present pleasure.  But as grief is here supposed to be the predominant passion, every addition falls to that side, and is swallowed up in it, without operating in the least upon the contrary affection.  It is the same case with those penances, which men inflict on themselves for their past sins and failings.  When a. criminal reflects on the punishment he deserves, the idea of it is magnifyed by a comparison with his present ease and satisfaction; which forces him, in a manner, to seek uneasiness, in order to avoid so disagreeable a contrast.

This reasoning will account for the origin of envy as well as of malice.  The only difference betwixt these passions lies in this, that envy is excited by some present enjoyment of another, which by comparison diminishes our idea of our own:  Whereas malice is the unprovoked desire of producing evil to another, in order to reap a pleasure from the comparison.  The enjoyment, which is the object of envy, is commonly superior to our own.  A superiority naturally seems to overshade us, and presents a disagreeable comparison.  But even in the case of an inferiority, we still desire a greater distance, in order to augment, still more the idea of ourself.  When this distance diminishes, the comparison is less to our advantage; and consequently gives us less pleasure, and is even disagreeable.  Hence arises that species of envy, which men feel, when they perceive their inferiors approaching or overtaking them in the pursuits of glory or happiness.  In this envy we may see the effects of comparison twice repeated.  A man, who compares himself to his inferior, receives a pleasure from the comparison:  And when the inferiority decreases by the elevation of the inferior, what should only have been a decrease of pleasure, becomes a real pain, by a new comparison with its preceding condition.

It is worthy of observation concerning that envy, which arises from a superiority in others, that it is not the great disproportion betwixt ourself and another, which produces it; but on the contrary, our proximity.  A common soldier bears no such envy to his general as to his sergeant or corporal; nor does an eminent writer meet with so great jealousy in common hackney scriblers, as in authors, that more nearly approach him.  It may, indeed, be thought, that the greater the disproportion is, the greater must be the uneasiness from the comparison.  But we may consider on the other hand, that the great disproportion cuts off the relation, and either keeps us from comparing ourselves with what is remote from us, or diminishes the effects of the comparison.  Resemblance and proximity always produce a relation of ideas; and where you destroy these ties, however other accidents may bring two ideas together; as they have no bond or connecting quality to join them in the imagination; it is impossible they can remain long united, or have any considerable influence on each other.