Nothing is more evident, than that any person acquires our kindness, or is exposed to our ill-will, in proportion to the pleasure or uneasiness we receive from him, and that the passions keep pace exactly with the sensations in all their changes and variations.  Whoever can find the means either by his services, his beauty, or his flattery, to render himself useful or agreeable to us, is sure of our affections:  As on the other hand, whoever harms or displeases us never fails to excite our anger or hatred.  When our own nation is at war with any other, we detest them under the character of cruel, perfidious, unjust and violent:  But always esteem ourselves and allies equitable, moderate, and merciful.  If the general of our enemies be successful, it is with difficulty we allow him the figure and character of a man.  He is a sorcerer:  He has a communication with daemons; as is reported of Oliver Cromwell, and the Duke of Luxembourg:  He is bloody-minded, and takes a pleasure in death and destruction.  But if the success be on our side, our commander has all the opposite good qualities, and is a pattern of virtue, as well as of courage and conduct.  His treachery we call policy:  His cruelty is an evil inseparable from war.  In short, every one of his faults we either endeavour to extenuate, or dignify it with the name of that virtue, which approaches it.  It is evident the same method of thinking runs through common life.

There are some, who add another condition, and require not only that the pain and pleasure arise from the person, but likewise that it arise knowingly, and with a particular design and intention.  A man, who wounds and harms us by accident, becomes not our enemy upon that account, nor do we think ourselves bound by any ties of gratitude to one, who does us any service after the same manner.  By the intention we judge of the actions, and according as that is good or bad, they become causes of love or hatred.

But here we must make a distinction.  If that quality in another, which pleases or displeases, be constant and inherent in his person and character, it will cause love or hatred independent of the intention:  But otherwise a knowledge and design is requisite, in order to give rise to these passions.  One that is disagreeable by his deformity or folly is the object of our aversion, though nothing be more certain, than that he has not the least intention of displeasing us by these qualities.  But if the uneasiness proceed not from a quality, but an action, which is produced and annihilated in a moment, it is necessary, in order to produce some relation, and connect this action sufficiently with the person. that it be derived from a particular fore-thought and design.  It is not enough, that the action arise from the person, and have him for its immediate cause and author.  This relation alone is too feeble and inconstant to be a foundation for these passions.  It reaches