Before we consider what they are in fact, let us determine what they ought to be, conformable to my hypothesis.  It is plain, that, according as the impression is either pleasant or uneasy, the passion of love or hatred must arise towards the person, who is thus connected to the cause of the impression by these double relations, which I have all along required.  The virtue of a brother must make me love him; as his vice or infamy must excite the contrary passion.  But to judge only from the situation of affairs, I should not expect, that the affections would rest there, and never transfuse themselves into any other impression.  As there is here a person, who by means of a double relation is the object of my passion, the very same reasoning leads me to think the passion will be carryed farther.  The person has a relation of ideas to myself, according to the supposition; the passion, of which he is the object, by being either agreeable or uneasy, has a relation of impressions to pride or humility.  It is evident, then, that one of these passions must arise from the love or hatred.

This is the reasoning I form in conformity to my hypothesis; and am pleased to find upon trial that every thing answers exactly to my expectation.  The virtue or vice of a son or brother not only excites love or hatred, but by a new transition, from similar causes, gives rise to pride or humility.  Nothing causes greater vanity than any shining quality in our relations; as nothing mortifies us more than their vice or infamy.  This exact conformity of experience to our reasoning is a convincing proof of the solidity of that hypothesis, upon which we reason.

Sixth Experiment.  This evidence will be still augmented, if we reverse the experiment, and preserving still the same relations, begin only with a different passion.  Suppose, that instead of the virtue or vice of a son or brother, which causes first love or hatred, and afterwards pride or humility, we place these good or bad qualities on ourselves, without any immediate connexion with the person, who is related to us:  Experience shews us, that by this change of situation the whole chain is broke, and that the mind is not conveyed from one passion to another, as in the preceding instance.  We never love or hate a son or brother for the virtue or vice we discern in ourselves; though it is evident the same qualities in him give us a very sensible pride or humility.  The transition from pride or humility to love or hatred is not so natural as from love or hatred to pride or humility.  This may at first sight be esteemed contrary to my hypothesis; since the relations of impressions and ideas are in both cases precisely the same.  Pride and humility are impressions related to love and hatred.  Myself am related to the person.  It should, therefore, be expected, that like causes must produce like effects, and a perfect transition arise from the double relation, as in all other cases.  This difficulty we may easily solve by the following reflections.