There are few persons, that are satisfyed with their own character, or genius, or fortune, who are nor desirous of shewing themselves to the world, and of acquiring the love and approbation of mankind.  Now it is evident, that the very same qualities and circumstances, which are the causes of pride or self-esteem, are also the causes of vanity or the desire of reputation; and that we always put to view those particulars with which in ourselves we are best satisfyed.  But if love and esteem were not produced by the same qualities as pride, according as these qualities are related to ourselves or others, this method of proceeding would be very absurd, nor coued men expect a correspondence in the sentiments of every other person, with those themselves have entertained.  It is true, few can form exact systems of the passions, or make reflections on their general nature and resemblances.  But without such a progress in philosophy, we are not subject to many mistakes in this particular, but are sufficiently guided by common experience, as well as by a kind of presentation; which tells us what will operate on others, by what we feel immediately in ourselves.  Since then the same qualities that produce pride or humility, cause love or hatred; all the arguments that have been employed to prove, that the causes of the former passions excite a pain or pleasure independent of the passion, will be applicable with equal evidence to the causes of the latter.

SECT.  II EXPERIMENTS TO CONFIRM THIS SYSTEM

Upon duly weighing these arguments, no one will make any scruple to assent to that condusion I draw from them, concerning the transition along related impressions and ideas, especially as it is a principle, in itself, so easy and natural.  But that we may place this system beyond doubt both with regard to love and hatred, pride and humility, it will be proper to make some new experiments upon all these passions, as well as to recal a few of these observations, which I have formerly touched upon.

In order to make these experiments, let us suppose I am m company with a person, whom I formerly regarded without any sentiments either of friendship or enmity.  Here I have the natural and ultimate object of all these four pas sions placed before me.  Myself am the proper object of pride or humility; the other person of love or hatred.

Regard now with attention the nature of these passions, and their situation with respect to each other.  It is evident here are four affections, placed, as it were, in a square or regular connexion with, and distance from each other.  The passions of pride and humility, as well as those of love and hatred, are connected together by the identity of their object, which to the first set of passions is self, to the second some other person.  These two lines of communication or connexion form two opposite sides of the square.  Again, pride and love are agreeable passions; hatred and humility uneasy.  This similitude of sensation betwixt pride and love, and that betwixt humility and hatred form a new connexion, and may be considered as the other two sides of the square.  Upon the whole, pride is connected with humility, love with hatred, by their objects or ideas:  Pride with love, humility with hatred, by their sensations or impressions.