their value, we are apt to overlook even what is essentially good in them.  These qualities of the mind have an effect upon joy as well as pride; and it is remarkable, that goods. which are common to all mankind, and have become familiar to us by custom, give us little satisfaction; though perhaps of a more excellent kind, than those on which, for their singularity, we set a much higher value.  But though this circumstance operates on both these passions, it has a much greater influence on vanity.  We are rejoiced for many goods, which, on account of their frequency, give us no pride.  Health, when it returns after a long absence, affords us a very sensible satisfaction; but is seldom regarded as a subject of vanity, because it is shared with such vast numbers.

The reason, why pride is so much more delicate in this particular than joy, I take to be, as follows.  In order to excite pride, there are always two objects we must contemplate. viz, the cause or that object which produces pleasure; and self, which is the real object of the passion.  But joy has only one object necessary to its production. viz, that which gives pleasure; and though it be requisite, that this bear some relation to self, yet that is only requisite in order to render it agreeable; nor is self, properly speaking, the object of this passion.  Since, therefore, pride has in a manner two objects, to which it directs our view; it follows, that where neither of them have any singularity, the passion must be more weakened upon that account, than a passion, which has only one object.  Upon comparing ourselves with others, as we are every moment apt to do, we find we are not in the least distinguished; and upon comparing the object we possess, we discover still the same unlucky circumstance.  By two comparisons so disadvantageous the passion must be entirely destroyed.

III The third limitation is, that the pleasant or painful object be very discernible and obvious, and that not only to ourselves, but to others also.  This circumstance, like the two foregoing, has an effect upon joy, as well as pride.  We fancy Ourselves more happy, as well as more virtuous or beautiful, when we appear so to others; but are still more ostentatious of our virtues than of our pleasures.  This proceeds from causes, which I shall endeavour to explain afterwards.

IV.  The fourth limitation is derived from the inconstancy of the cause of these passions, and from the short duration of its connexion with ourselves.  What is casual and inconstant gives but little joy, and less pride.  We are not much satisfyed with the thing itself; and are still less apt to feel any new degrees of self-satisfaction upon its account.  We foresee and anticipate its change by the imagination; which makes us little satisfyed with the thing:  We compare it to ourselves, whose existence is more durable; by which means its inconstancy appears still greater.  It seems ridiculous to infer an excellency in ourselves from an object, which is of so much shorter duration, and attends us during so small a part of our existence.  It will be easy to comprehend the reason, why this cause operates not with the same force in joy as in pride; since the idea of self is not so essential to the former passion as to the latter.