We must therefore, make a distinction betwixt the cause and the object of these passions; betwixt that idea, which excites them, and that to which they direct their view, when excited.  Pride and humility, being once raised, immediately turn our attention to ourself, and regard that as their ultimate and final object; but there is something farther requisite in order to raise them:  Something, which is peculiar to one of the passions, and produces not both in the very same degree.  The first idea, that is presented to the mind, is that of the cause or productive principle.  This excites the passion, connected with it; and that passion, when excited. turns our view to another idea, which is that of self.  Here then is a passion placed betwixt two ideas, of which the one produces it, and the other is produced by it.  The first idea, therefore, represents the cause, the second the object of the passion.

To begin with the causes of pride and humility; we may observe, that their most obvious and remarkable property is the vast variety of subjects, on which they may be placed.  Every valuable quality of the mind, whether of the imagination, judgment, memory or disposition; wit, good-sense, learning, courage, justice, integrity; all these are the cause of pride; and their opposites of humility.  Nor are these passions confined to the mind but extend their view to the body likewise.  A man may he proud of his beauty, strength, agility, good mein, address in dancing, riding, and of his dexterity in any manual business or manufacture.  But this is not all.  The passions looking farther, comprehend whatever objects are in the least allyed or related to us.  Our country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, cloaths; any of these may become a cause either of pride or of humility.

From the consideration of these causes, it appears necessary we shoud make a new distinction in the causes of the passion, betwixt that quality, which operates, and the subject, on which it is placed.  A man, for instance, is vain of a beautiful house, which belongs to him, or which he has himself built and contrived.  Here the object of the passion is himself, and the cause is the beautiful house:  Which cause again is sub-divided into two parts, viz. the quality, which operates upon the passion, and the subject in which the quality inheres.  The quality is the beauty, and the subject is the house, considered as his property or contrivance.  Both these parts are essential, nor is the distinction vain and chimerical.  Beauty, considered merely as such, unless placed upon something related to us, never produces any pride or vanity; and the strongest. relation alone, without beauty, or something else in its place, has as little influence on that passion.  Since, therefore, these two particulars are easily separated and there is a necessity for their conjunction, in order to produce the passion, we ought to consider them as component parts of the cause; and infix in our minds an exact idea of this distinction.