I. The explanation of the baseness of the avaricious functions of the Lower Pthah, p. 54, with his beetle-gospel, p. 59, “that a nation can stand on its vices better than on its virtues,” explains the main motive of all my books on Political Economy.

II.  The examination of the connection between stupidity and crime, pp. 87-96, anticipated all that I have had to urge in Fors Clavigera against the commonly alleged excuse for public wickedness,—­“They don’t mean it—­they don’t know any better.”

III.  The examination of the roots of Moral Power, pp. 145-149, is a summary of what is afterwards developed with utmost care in my inaugural lecture at Oxford on the relation of Art to Morals; compare in that lecture, sections 83-85, with the sentence in p. 147 of this book, “Nothing is ever done so as really to please our Father, unless we would also have done it, though we had had no Father to know of it.”

This sentence, however, it must be observed, regards only the general conditions of action in the children of God, in consequence of which it is foretold of them by Christ that they will say at the Judgment, “When saw we thee?” It does not refer to the distinct cases in which virtue consists in faith given to command, appearing to foolish human judgment inconsistent with the Moral Law, as in the sacrifice of Isaac; nor to those in which any directly-given command requires nothing more of virtue than obedience.

IV.  The subsequent pages, 149-158, were written especially to check the dangerous impulses natural to the minds of many amiable young women, in the direction of narrow and selfish religious sentiment:  and they contain, therefore, nearly everything which I believe it necessary that young people should be made to observe, respecting the errors of monastic life.  But they in nowise enter on the reverse, or favorable side:  of which indeed I did not, and as yet do not, feel myself able to speak with any decisiveness; the evidence on that side, as stated in the text, having “never yet been dispassionately examined.”

V. The dialogue with Lucilla, beginning at p. 96, is, to my own fancy, the best bit of conversation in the book; and the issue of it, at p. 103, the most practically and immediately useful.  For on the idea of the inevitable weakness and corruption of human nature, has logically followed, in our daily life, the horrible creed of modern “Social science,” that all social action must be scientifically founded on vicious impulses.  But on the habit of measuring and reverencing our powers and talents that we may kindly use them, will be founded a true Social science, developing, by the employment of them, all the real powers and honorable feelings of the race.