in authoritarian institutions to which men blindly submit.  In this way Fichte deduces five historical epochs:  two in which progress is blind, two in which it is free, and an intermediate in which it is struggling to consciousness. [Footnote:  First Epoch:  that of instinctive reason; the age of innocence.  Second:  that of authoritarian reason.  Third:  that of enfranchisement; the age of scepticism and unregulated liberty.  Fourth:  that of conscious reason, as science.  Fifth:  that of regnant reason, as art.] But there are no locked gates between these periods; they overlap and mingle; each may have some of the characteristics of another; and in each there is a vanguard leading the way and a rearguard lagging behind.

At present (1804) we are in the third age; we have broken with authority, but do not yet possess a clear and disciplined knowledge of reason. [Footnote:  Three years later, however, Fichte maintained in his patriotic Discourses to the German Nation (1807) that in 1804 man had crossed the threshold of the fourth epoch.  He asserted that the progress of “culture” and science will depend henceforward chiefly on Germany.] Fichte has deduced this scheme purely a priori without any reference to actual experience.  “The philosopher,” he says, “follows the a priori thread of the world-plan which is clear to him without any history; and if he makes use of history, it is not to prove anything, since his theses are already proved independently of all history.”

Historical development is thus presented as a necessary progress towards a goal which is known but cannot be reached.  And this fact as to the destiny of the race constitutes the basis of morality, of which the fundamental law is to act in such a way as to promote the free realisation of reason upon earth.  It has been claimed by a recent critic that Fichte was the first modern philosopher to humanise morals.  He completely rejected the individualistic conception which underlay Kantian as well as Christian ethics.  He asserted that the true motive of morality is not the salvation of the individual man but the Progress of humanity.  In fact, with Fichte Progress is the principle of ethics.  That the Christian ideal of ascetic saintliness detached from society has no moral value is a plain corollary from the idea of earthly Progress. [Footnote:  X. Leon, La Philosophie de Fichte (1902), pp. 477-9.]

One other point in Fichte’s survey of history deserves notice—­the social role of the savant.  It is the function of the savant to discover the truths which are a condition of moral progress; he may be said to incarnate reason in the world.  We shall see how this idea played a prominent part in the social schemes of Saint-Simon and Comte. [Footnote:  Fichte, Ueber die Bestimmung des Gelehrten (1794).]

5.