artillery, with McCook’s broken division of cavalry, seventeen hundred and fifty-four men and horses.  For this purpose I also placed the Fourteenth Corps (Palmer) under his orders.  This corps numbered at the time seventeen thousand two hundred and eighty-eight infantry and eight hundred and twenty-six artillery; but General Palmer claimed to rank General Schofield in the date of his commission as major-general, and denied the latter’s right to exercise command over him.  General Palmer was a man of ability, but was not enterprising.  His three divisions were compact and strong, well commanded, admirable on the defensive, but slow to move or to act on the offensive.  His corps (the Fourteenth) had sustained, up to that time, fewer hard knocks than any other corps in the whole army, and I was anxious to give it a chance.  I always expected to have a desperate fight to get possession of the Macon road, which was then the vital objective of the campaign.  Its possession by us would, in my judgment, result in the capture of Atlanta, and give us the fruits of victory, although the destruction of Hood’s army was the real object to be desired.  Yet Atlanta was known as the “Gate-City of the South,” was full of founderies, arsenals, and machine-shops, and I knew that its capture would be the death-knell of the Southern Confederacy.

On the 4th of August I ordered General Schofield to make a bold attack on the railroad, anywhere about East Point, and ordered General Palmer to report to him for duty.  He at once denied General Schofield’s right to command him; but, after examining the dates of their respective commissions, and hearing their arguments, I wrote to General Palmer.

August 4th.-10.45 p.m.

From the statements made by yourself and General Schofield to-day, my decision is, that he ranks you as a major-general, being of the same date of present commission, by reason of his previous superior rank as brigadier-general.  The movements of to-morrow are so important that the orders of the superior on that flank must be regarded as military orders, and not in the nature of cooperation.  I did hope that there would be no necessity for my making this decision; but it is better for all parties interested that no question of rank should occur in actual battle.  The Sandtown road, and the railroad, if possible, must be gained to-morrow, if it costs half your command.  I regard the loss of time this afternoon as equal to the loss of two thousand men.

I also communicated the substance of this to General Thomas, to whose army Palmer’s corps belonged, who replied on the 5th: 

I regret to hear that Palmer has taken the course he has, and I know that he intends to offer his resignation as soon as he can properly do so.  I recommend that his application be granted.

And on the 5th I again wrote to General Palmer, arguing the point with him, advising him, as a friend, not to resign at that crisis lest his motives might be misconstrued, and because it might damage his future career in civil life; but, at the same time, I felt it my duty to say to him that the operations on that flank, during the 4th and 5th, had not been satisfactory—­not imputing to him, however, any want of energy or skill, but insisting that “the events did not keep pace with my desires.”  General Schofield had reported to me that night: