left. When we emerged from the woods, the enemy
opened upon us; crossing the bayou under fire, and
many of the men sinking in the mud and water, our line
was very much disordered, but we pretty well restored
it before reaching the abatis. Here we were
greatly disordered, but somewhat restored the line
on reaching the plateau or corn-field. The Twenty-ninth
Missouri came on, gallantly supporting us. The
Thirteenth Illinois came out upon the corn-field,
and the Fifty-eighth Ohio followed close upon it.
There was firing to my left, and as I afterward learned
was from the Fourth Iowa of Thayer’s brigade
(and I believe of Steele’s division).
I was struck and fell, and my regiment went back in
great disorder. The fire was terrific.
I saw beyond the Thirteenth Illinois, to my right,
a disordered line, and learned afterward it was the
Sixteenth Ohio. When I was taken from the field
by the enemy and taken into Vicksburg, I found among
the wounded and prisoners men and officers of the
Sixteenth and Fifty-eighth Ohio, and of the Twenty-ninth
and Thirty-first Missouri, and Thirteenth Illinois.
After I was exchanged and joined my command, General
Blair laughingly remarked to me that I had literally
obeyed his order and gone “straight on to Vicksburg.”
He lamented the cutting to pieces of our force on that
day. We talked the whole matter over at his
headquarters during the siege of Vicksburg.
He said that if the charge had been made along our
whole line with the same vigor of attack made by his
brigade, and if we had been supported as Morgan promised
to do, we might have succeeded. I dissented
from the opinion that we could even then have succeeded.
I asked him what excuse Morgan gave for failing to
support us, and he said that Colonel or General De
Courcey was in some manner to blame for that, but
he said Morgan was mistaken as to the nature of the
ground and generally as to the feasibility of the
whole thing, and was responsible for the failure to
afford us the support he had promised; that he and
General Sherman and all of them were misled by the
statements and opinions of Morgan as to the situation
in our front, and Morgan was, on his part, deceived
by the reports of his scouts about other matters as
well as the matter of the water in the bayou.
THOMAS C. FLETCHER
ARKANSAS POST.
Extracts from Admiral Porter’s Journal.
Sherman and I had made arrangements to capture Arkansas
Post.
On the 31st of December, while preparing to go out
of the Yazoo, an army officer called to see me, and
said that he belonged to General McClernand’s
staff, and that the general was at the mouth of the
Yazoo River, and desired to see me at once. I
sent word to the general that if he wished to see
me he could have an opportunity by calling on board
my flag-ship.
A few moments after I had heard the news of McClernand’a
arrival, I saw Sherman pulling about in a boat, and
hailed him, informing him that McClernand was at the
mouth of the Yazoo. Sherman then came on board,
and, in consequence of this unexpected news, determined
to postpone the movement out of the Yazoo River, and
let McClernand take that upon himself.