of paper, and was in General McClernand’s handwriting, to the effect that “his troops had captured the rebel parapet in his front,” that, “the flag of the Union waved over the stronghold of Vicksburg,” and asking him (General Grant) to give renewed orders to McPherson and Sherman to press their attacks on their respective fronts, lest the enemy should concentrate on him (McClernand).  General Grant said, “I don’t believe a word of it;” but I reasoned with him, that this note was official, and must be credited, and I offered to renew the assault at once with new troops.  He said he would instantly ride down the line to McClernand’s front, and if I did not receive orders to the contrary, by 3 o’clock p.m., I might try it again.  Mower’s fresh brigade was brought up under cover, and some changes were made in Giles Smith’s brigade; and, punctually at 3 p.m., hearing heavy firing down along the line to my left, I ordered the second assault.  It was a repetition of the first, equally unsuccessful and bloody.  It also transpired that the same thing had occurred with General McPherson, who lost in this second assault some most valuable officers and men, without adequate result; and that General McClernand, instead of having taken any single point of the rebel main parapet, had only taken one or two small outlying lunettes open to the rear, where his men were at the mercy of the rebels behind their main parapet, and most of them were actually thus captured.  This affair caused great feeling with us, and severe criticisms on General McClernand, which led finally to his removal from the command of the Thirteenth Corps, to which General Ord succeeded.  The immediate cause, however, of General McClernand’s removal was the publication of a sort of congratulatory order addressed to his troops, first published in St. Louis, in which he claimed that he had actually succeeded in making a lodgment in Vicksburg, but had lost it, owing to the fact that McPherson and Sherman did not fulfill their parts of the general plan of attack.  This was simply untrue.  The two several assaults made May 22d, on the lines of Vicksburg, had failed, by reason of the great strength of the position and the determined fighting of its garrison.  I have since seen the position at Sevastopol, and without hesitation I declare that at Vicksburg to have been the more difficult of the two.

Thereafter our proceedings were all in the nature of a siege.  General Grant drew more troops from Memphis, to prolong our general line to the left, so as completely to invest the place on its land-side, while the navy held the river both above and below.  General Mower’s brigade of Tuttle’s division was also sent across the river to the peninsula, so that by May 31st Vicksburg was completely beleaguered.  Good roads were constructed from our camps to the several landing-places on the Yazoo River, to which points our boats brought us ample supplies; so that we were in a splendid condition for a siege, while our enemy was shut up in a close fort, with a large civil population of men, women, and children to feed, in addition to his combatant force.  If we could prevent sallies, or relief from the outside, the fate of the garrison of Vicksburg was merely a question of time.