Whether General Scott approved of the Mexican war and the manner in which it was brought about, I have no means of knowing.  His orders to troops indicate only a soldierly spirit, with probably a little regard for the perpetuation of his own fame.  On the other hand, General Taylor’s, I think, indicate that he considered the administration accountable for the war, and felt no responsibility resting on himself further than for the faithful performance of his duties.  Both generals deserve the commendations of their countrymen and to live in the grateful memory of this people to the latest generation.

Earlier in this narrative I have stated that the plain, reached after passing the mountains east of Perote, extends to the cities of Puebla and Mexico.  The route travelled by the army before reaching Puebla, goes over a pass in a spur of mountain coming up from the south.  This pass is very susceptible of defence by a smaller against a larger force.  Again, the highest point of the road-bed between Vera Cruz and the City of Mexico is over Rio Frio mountain, which also might have been successfully defended by an inferior against a superior force.  But by moving north of the mountains, and about thirty miles north of Puebla, both of these passes would have been avoided.  The road from Perote to the City of Mexico, by this latter route, is as level as the prairies in our West.  Arriving due north from Puebla, troops could have been detached to take possession of that place, and then proceeding west with the rest of the army no mountain would have been encountered before reaching the City of Mexico.  It is true this road would have brought troops in by Guadalupe—­a town, church and detached spur of mountain about two miles north of the capital, all bearing the same general name —­and at this point Lake Texcoco comes near to the mountain, which was fortified both at the base and on the sides:  but troops could have passed north of the mountain and come in only a few miles to the north-west, and so flanked the position, as they actually did on the south.

It has always seemed to me that this northern route to the City of Mexico, would have been the better one to have taken.  But my later experience has taught me two lessons:  first, that things are seen plainer after the events have occurred; second, that the most confident critics are generally those who know the least about the matter criticised.  I know just enough about the Mexican war to approve heartily of most of the generalship, but to differ with a little of it.  It is natural that an important city like Puebla should not have been passed with contempt; it may be natural that the direct road to it should have been taken; but it could have been passed, its evacuation insured and possession acquired without danger of encountering the enemy in intricate mountain defiles.  In this same way the City of Mexico could have been approached without any danger of opposition, except in the open field.