was directed to hold on where he was, and fortify.
General Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into
his main line on the Hatcher, near Burgess’s
Mills. Generals Ord, Wright, and Parke made examinations
in their fronts to determine the feasibility of an
assault on the enemy’s lines. The two latter
reported favorably. The enemy confronting us
as he did, at every point from Richmond to our extreme
left, I conceived his lines must be weakly held, and
could be penetrated if my estimate of his forces was
correct. I determined, therefore, to extend
our line no farther, but to reinforce General Sheridan
with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut
loose and turn the enemy’s right flank, and
with the other corps assault the enemy’s lines.
The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the
week before, when he assaulted Fort Stedman, particularly
favored this. The enemy’s intrenched
picket-line captured by us at that time threw the
lines occupied by the belligerents so close together
at some points that it was but a moment’s run
from one to the other. Preparations were at once
made to relieve General Humphreys’s corps, to
report to General Sheridan; but the condition of the
roads prevented immediate movement. On the morning
of the 31st, General Warren reported favorably to getting
possession of the White Oak Road, and was directed
to do so. To accomplish this, he moved with
one division, instead of his whole corps, which was
attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven
back on the 2d division before it had time to form,
and it, in turn, forced back upon the 3d division,
when the enemy was checked. A division of the
2d corps was immediately sent to his support, the
enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession
of the White Oak Road gained. Sheridan advanced,
and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of
the Five Forks; but the enemy, after the affair with
the 5th corps, reinforced the rebel cavalry, defending
that point with infantry, and forced him back towards
Dinwiddie Court House. Here General Sheridan
displayed great generalship. Instead of retreating
with his whole command on the main army, to tell the
story of superior forces encountered, he deployed
his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough
to take charge of the horses. This compelled
the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of wooded and
broken country, and made his progress slow. At
this juncture he dispatched to me what had taken place,
and that he was dropping back slowly on Dinwiddie
Court House. General Mackenzie’s cavalry
and one division of the 5th corps were immediately
ordered to his assistance. Soon after receiving
a report from General Meade that Humphreys could hold
our position on the Boydton Road, and that the other
two divisions of the 5th corps could go to Sheridan,
they were so ordered at once. Thus the operations
of the day necessitated the sending of Warren, because
of his accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was
intended, and precipitated intended movements.
On the morning of the 1st of April, General Sheridan,
reinforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back
on Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted
and carried his strongly fortified position, capturing
all his artillery and between five and six thousand
prisoners.