Meade.  He now felt that he could not cross that creek without bridges, and his orders were changed to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank or get in their rear; but he was so late in getting up that Sheridan determined to move forward without him.  However, Ayres’s division of Warren’s corps reached him in time to be in the fight all day, most of the time separated from the remainder of the 5th corps and fighting directly under Sheridan.

Warren reported to Sheridan about 11 o’clock on the 1st, but the whole of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in the afternoon.  Griffin’s division in backing to get out of the way of a severe cross fire of the enemy was found marching away from the fighting.  This did not continue long, however; the division was brought back and with Ayres’s division did most excellent service during the day.  Crawford’s division of the same corps had backed still farther off, and although orders were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was late before it finally got to where it could be of material assistance.  Once there it did very excellent service.

Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little later, in advancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault upon Five Forks itself.  He was very impatient to make the assault and have it all over before night, because the ground he occupied would be untenable for him in bivouac during the night.  Unless the assault was made and was successful, he would be obliged to return to Dinwiddie Court-House, or even further than that for the night.

It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan wanted to get Crawford’s division in hand, and he also wanted Warren.  He sent staff officer after staff officer in search of Warren, directing that general to report to him, but they were unable to find him.  At all events Sheridan was unable to get that officer to him.  Finally he went himself.  He issued an order relieving Warren and assigning Griffin to the command of the 5th corps.  The troops were then brought up and the assault successfully made.

I was so much dissatisfied with Warren’s dilatory movements in the battle of White Oak Road and in his failure to reach Sheridan in time, that I was very much afraid that at the last moment he would fail Sheridan.  He was a man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quick perception, and could make his dispositions as quickly as any officer, under difficulties where he was forced to act.  But I had before discovered a defect which was beyond his control, that was very prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just before us.  He could see every danger at a glance before he had encountered it.  He would not only make preparations to meet the danger which might occur, but he would inform his commanding officer what others should do while he was executing his move.