My hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry Five Forks, get on the enemy’s right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their centre to protect their right so that an assault in the centre might be successfully made.  General Wright’s corps had been designated to make this assault, which I intended to order as soon as information reached me of Sheridan’s success.  He was to move under cover as close to the enemy as he could get.

It is natural to suppose that Lee would understand my design to be to get up to the South Side and ultimately to the Danville Railroad, as soon as he had heard of the movement commenced on the 29th.  These roads were so important to his very existence while he remained in Richmond and Petersburg, and of such vital importance to him even in case of retreat, that naturally he would make most strenuous efforts to defend them.  He did on the 30th send Pickett with five brigades to reinforce Five Forks.  He also sent around to the right of his army some two or three other divisions, besides directing that other troops be held in readiness on the north side of the James River to come over on call.  He came over himself to superintend in person the defence of his right flank.

Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of the 30th, and then took a road leading north-west to Five Forks.  He had only his cavalry with him.  Soon encountering the rebel cavalry he met with a very stout resistance.  He gradually drove them back however until in the neighborhood of Five Forks.  Here he had to encounter other troops besides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way.

In this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken place and stated that he was falling back toward Dinwiddie gradually and slowly, and asked me to send Wright’s corps to his assistance.  I replied to him that it was impossible to send Wright’s corps because that corps was already in line close up to the enemy, where we should want to assault when the proper time came, and was besides a long distance from him; but the 2d (Humphreys’s) and 5th (Warren’s) corps were on our extreme left and a little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the left flank of the enemy at Five Forks, and that I would send Warren.

Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move at once that night (the 31st) to Dinwiddie Court House and put himself in communication with Sheridan as soon as possible, and report to him.  He was very slow in moving, some of his troops not starting until after 5 o’clock next morning.  When he did move it was done very deliberately, and on arriving at Gravelly Run he found the stream swollen from the recent rains so that he regarded it as not fordable.  Sheridan of course knew of his coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as possible, sent orders to him to hasten.  He was also hastened or at least ordered to move up rapidly by General