A little incident occurred, soon after the fall of Savannah, which Sherman relates in his Memoirs, and which is worthy of repetition.  Savannah was one of the points where blockade runners entered.  Shortly after the city fell into our possession, a blockade runner came sailing up serenely, not doubting but the Confederates were still in possession.  It was not molested, and the captain did not find out his mistake until he had tied up and gone to the Custom House, where he found a new occupant of the building, and made a less profitable disposition of his vessel and cargo than he had expected.

As there was some discussion as to the authorship of Sherman’s march to the sea, by critics of his book when it appeared before the public, I want to state here that no question upon that subject was ever raised between General Sherman and myself.  Circumstances made the plan on which Sherman expected to act impracticable, as as commander of the forces he necessarily had to devise a new on which would give more promise of success:  consequently he recommended the destruction of the railroad back to Chattanooga, and that he should be authorized then to move, as he did, from Atlanta forward.  His suggestions were finally approved, although they did not immediately find favor in Washington.  Even when it came to the time of starting, the greatest apprehension, as to the propriety of the campaign he was about commence, filled the mind of the President, induced no doubt by his advisers.  This went so far as to move the President to ask me to suspend Sherman’s march for a day or two until I could think the matter over.  My recollection is, though I find no record to show it, that out of deference to the President’s wish I did send a dispatch to Sherman asking him to wait a day or two, or else the connections between us were already cut so that I could not do so.  However this may be, the question of who devised the plan of march from Atlanta to Savannah is easily answered:  it was clearly Sherman, and to him also belongs the credit of its brilliant execution.  It was hardly possible that any one else than those on the spot could have devised a new plan of campaign to supersede one that did not promise success. (40)

I was in favor of Sherman’s plan from the time it was first submitted to me.  My chief of staff, however, was very bitterly opposed to it and, as I learned subsequently, finding that he could not move me, he appealed to the authorities at Washington to stop it.

CHAPTER LX.

THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN—­THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.