“If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at Augusta, or Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville, and compel Hood to give up Augusta or Macon, and then turn on the other. * * * If you can manage to take the Savannah River as high up as Augusta, or the Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the whole State of Georgia.”

On the 12th I sent a special messenger, one of my own staff, with a letter inviting Sherman’s views about the next campaign.

CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 12, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Mill Division of the
Mississippi.

I send Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of my staff, with this.  Colonel Porter will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than I can do in the limits of a letter.  Although I feel myself strong enough for offensive operations, I am holding on quietly to get advantage of recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly.  My lines are necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom north of the James across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the James, and south of the Appomattox to the Weldon Road.  This line is very strongly fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from its great length takes many in the aggregate.  I propose, when I do move, to extend my left so as to control what is known as the South Side, or Lynchburg and Petersburg Road, then if possible to keep the Danville Road cut.  At the same time this move is made, I want to send a force of from six to ten thousand men against Wilmington.

The way I propose to do this is to land the men north of Fort Fisher, and hold that point.  At the same time a large naval fleet will be assembled there, and the iron-clads will run the batteries as they did at Mobile.  This will give us the same control of the harbor of Wilmington that we now have of the harbor of Mobile.  What you are to do with the forces at your command, I do not see.  The difficulties of supplying your army, except when you are constantly moving, beyond where you are, I plainly see.  If it had not been for Price’s movements Canby would have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile.  From your command on the Mississippi an equal number could have been taken.  With these forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to Mobile and the other half to Savannah.  You could then move as proposed in your telegram, so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally.  Whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new base of supplies.  My object now in sending a staff officer is not so much to suggest operations for you, as to get your views and have plans matured by the time everything can be got ready.  It will probably be the 5th of October before any of the plans herein indicated will be executed.

If you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward and I will approve them. * * *