On the north side of the James River the enemy attacked Kautz’s cavalry on the 7th of October, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery.  This was followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter.  On the 13th a reconnoissance was sent out by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in heavy loss to us.

On the 24th I ordered General Meade to attempt to get possession of the South Side Railroad, and for that purpose to advance on the 27th.  The attempt proved a failure, however, the most advanced of our troops not getting nearer than within six miles of the point aimed for.  Seeing the impossibility of its accomplishment I ordered the troops to withdraw, and they were all back in their former positions the next day.

Butler, by my directions, also made a demonstration on the north side of the James River in order to support this move, by detaining there the Confederate troops who were on that side.  He succeeded in this, but failed of further results by not marching past the enemy’s left before turning in on the Darby road and by reason of simply coming up against their lines in place.

This closed active operations around Richmond for the winter.  Of course there was frequent skirmishing between pickets, but no serious battle was fought near either Petersburg or Richmond.  It would prolong this work to give a detailed account of all that took place from day to day around Petersburg and at other parts of my command, and it would not interest the general reader if given.  All these details can be found by the military student in a series of books published by the Scribners, Badeau’s history of my campaigns, and also in the publications of the War Department, including both the National and Confederate reports.

In the latter part of November General Hancock was relieved from the command of the 2d corps by the Secretary of War and ordered to Washington, to organize and command a corps of veteran troops to be designated the 1st corps.  It was expected that this would give him a large command to co-operate with in the spring.  It was my expectation, at the time, that in the final operations Hancock should move either up the valley, or else east of the Blue Ridge to Lynchburg; the idea being to make the spring campaign the close of the war.  I expected, with Sherman coming up from the South, Meade south of Petersburg and around Richmond, and Thomas’s command in Tennessee with depots of supplies established in the eastern part of that State, to move from the direction of Washington or the valley towards Lynchburg.  We would then have Lee so surrounded that his supplies would be cut off entirely, making it impossible for him to support his army.

General Humphreys, chief-of-staff of the Army of the Potomac, was assigned to the command of the 2d corps, to succeed Hancock.