Our troops fortified their new position, bringing Fort Harrison into the new line and extending it to the river.  This brought us pretty close to the enemy on the north side of the James, and the two opposing lines maintained their relative positions to the close of the siege.

In the afternoon a further attempt was made to advance, but it failed.  Ord fell badly wounded, and had to be relieved; the command devolved upon General Heckman, and later General Weitzel was assigned to the command of the 18th corps.  During the night Lee reinforced his troops about Fort Gilmer, which was at the right of Fort Harrison, by eight additional brigades from Petersburg, and attempted to retake the works which we had captured by concentrating ten brigades against them.  All their efforts failed, their attacks being all repulsed with very heavy loss.  In one of these assaults upon us General Stannard, a gallant officer who was defending Fort Harrison, lost an arm.  Our casualties during these operations amounted to 394 killed, I,554 wounded and 324 missing.

Whilst this was going on General Meade was instructed to keep up an appearance of moving troops to our extreme left.  Parke and Warren were kept with two divisions, each under arms, ready to move leaving their enclosed batteries manned, with a scattering line on the other intrenchments.  The object of this was to prevent reinforcements from going to the north side of the river.  Meade was instructed to watch the enemy closely and, if Lee weakened his lines, to make an attack.

On the 30th these troops moved out, under Warren, and captured an advanced intrenched camp at Peeble’s farm, driving the enemy back to the main line.  Our troops followed and made an attack in the hope of carrying the enemy’s main line; but in this they were unsuccessful and lost a large number of men, mostly captured.  The number of killed and wounded was not large.  The next day our troops advanced again and established themselves, intrenching a new line about a mile in front of the enemy.  This advanced Warren’s position on the Weldon Railroad very considerably.

Sheridan having driven the enemy out of the valley, and taken the productions of the valley so that instead of going there for supplies the enemy would have to bring his provisions with him if he again entered it, recommended a reduction of his own force, the surplus to be sent where it could be of more use.  I approved of his suggestion, and ordered him to send Wright’s corps back to the James River.  I further directed him to repair the railroad up the Shenandoah Valley towards the advanced position which we would hold with a small force.  The troops were to be sent to Washington by the way of Culpeper, in order to watch the east side of the Blue Ridge, and prevent the enemy from getting into the rear of Sheridan while he was still doing his work of destruction.

The valley was so very important, however, to the Confederate army that, contrary to our expectations, they determined to make one more strike, and save it if possible before the supplies should be all destroyed.  Reinforcements were sent therefore to Early, and this before any of our troops had been withdrawn.  Early prepared to strike Sheridan at Harrisonburg; but the latter had not remained there.