Sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with, 8,000 of them being cavalry.  Early had about the same number, but the superior ability of the National commander over the Confederate commander was so great that all the latter’s advantage of being on the defensive was more than counterbalanced by this circumstance.  As I had predicted, Early was soon found in front of Sheridan in the valley, and Pennsylvania and Maryland were speedily freed from the invaders.  The importance of the valley was so great to the Confederates that Lee reinforced Early, but not to the extent that we thought and feared he would.

To prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being sent out from Richmond, I had to do something to compel Lee to retain his forces about his capital.  I therefore gave orders for another move to the north side of the James River, to threaten Richmond.  Hancock’s corps, part of the 10th corps under Birney, and Gregg’s division of cavalry were crossed to the north side of the James during the night of the 13th-14th of August.  A threatening position was maintained for a number of days, with more or less skirmishing, and some tolerably hard fighting; although it was my object and my instructions that anything like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should present themselves which would insure great success.  General Meade was left in command of the few troops around Petersburg, strongly intrenched; and was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side.  There was no particular victory gained on either side; but during that time no more reinforcements were sent to the valley.

I informed Sheridan of what had been done to prevent reinforcements being sent from Richmond against him, and also that the efforts we had made had proven that one of the divisions which we supposed had gone to the valley was still at Richmond, because we had captured six or seven hundred prisoners from that division, each of its four brigades having contributed to our list of captures.  I also informed him that but one division had gone, and it was possible that I should be able to prevent the going of any more.

To add to my embarrassment at this time Sherman, who was now near Atlanta, wanted reinforcements.  He was perfectly willing to take the raw troops then being raised in the North-west, saying that he could teach them more soldiering in one day among his troops than they would learn in a week in a camp of instruction.  I therefore asked that all troops in camps of instruction in the North-west be sent to him.  Sherman also wanted to be assured that no Eastern troops were moving out against him.  I informed him of what I had done and assured him that I would hold all the troops there that it was possible for me to hold, and that up to that time none had gone.  I also informed