The Shenandoah Valley was very important to the Confederates, because it was the principal storehouse they now had for feeding their armies about Richmond.  It was well known that they would make a desperate struggle to maintain it.  It had been the source of a great deal of trouble to us heretofore to guard that outlet to the north, partly because of the incompetency of some of the commanders, but chiefly because of interference from Washington.

It seemed to be the policy of General Halleck and Secretary Stanton to keep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving right and left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital; and, generally speaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy was lost.  They were left, therefore, free to supply themselves with horses, beef cattle, and such provisions as they could carry away from Western Maryland and Pennsylvania.  I determined to put a stop to this.  I started Sheridan at once for that field of operation, and on the following day sent another division of his cavalry.

I had previously asked to have Sheridan assigned to that command, but Mr. Stanton objected, on the ground that he was too young for so important a command.  On the 1st of August when I sent reinforcements for the protection of Washington, I sent the following orders: 

CITY POINT, VA.,

August 1, 1864, 11.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington D. C.

I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty whilst the enemy is being expelled from the border.  Unless General Hunter is in the field in person, I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death.  Wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also.  Once started up the valley they ought to be followed until we get possession of the Virginia Central Railroad.  If General Hunter is in the field, give Sheridan direct command of the 6th corps and cavalry division.  All the cavalry, I presume, will reach Washington in the course of to-morrow.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

The President in some way or other got to see this dispatch of mine directing certain instructions to be given to the commanders in the field, operating against Early, and sent me the following very characteristic dispatch: 

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY TELEGRAPH, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., August 3, 1864.

Cypher. 6 P.M.,

LT.  GENERAL GRANT, City Point, Va.

I have seen your despatch in which you say, “I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy, and follow him to the death.  Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also.”  This, I think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move.  But please look over the despatches you may have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here, of “putting our army south of the enemy,” or of “following him to the death” in any direction.  I repeat to you it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it.