The arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men, and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as great numbers.  My object in having them sent to Belle Plain was to use them as an escort to our supply trains.  If it is more convenient to send them out by train to march from the railroad to Belle Plain or Fredericksburg, send them so.

I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take.

Up to this time there is no indication of any portion of Lee’s army being detached for the defence of Richmond.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

And also, I received information, through the War Department, from General Butler that his cavalry under Kautz had cut the railroad south of Petersburg, separating Beauregard from Richmond, and had whipped Hill, killing, wounding and capturing many.  Also that he was intrenched, and could maintain himself.  On this same day came news from Sheridan to the effect that he had destroyed ten miles of the railroad and telegraph between Lee and Richmond, one and a half million rations, and most of the medical stores for his army.

On the 8th I had directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac and pass around the left of Lee’s army and attack his cavalry and communications, which was successfully executed in the manner I have already described.

CHAPTER LIII.

HANCOCK’S ASSAULT-LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES—­PROMOTIONS RECOMMENDED —­DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY—­EWELL’S ATTACK-REDUCING THE ARTILLERY.

In the reconnoissance made by Mott on the 11th, a salient was discovered at the right centre.  I determined that an assault should be made at that point. (28) Accordingly in the afternoon Hancock was ordered to move his command by the rear of Warren and Wright, under cover of night, to Wright’s left, and there form it for an assault at four o’clock the next morning.  The night was dark, it rained heavily, and the road was difficult, so that it was midnight when he reached the point where he was to halt.  It took most of the night to get the men in position for their advance in the morning.  The men got but little rest.  Burnside was ordered to attack (29) on the left of the salient at the same hour.  I sent two of my staff officers to impress upon him the importance of pushing forward vigorously.  Hancock was notified of this.  Warren and Wright were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join in the assault if circumstances made it advisable.  I occupied a central position most convenient for receiving information from all points.  Hancock put Barlow on his left, in double column, and Birney to his right.  Mott followed Birney, and Gibbon was held in reserve.

The morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more than half an hour.