The moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all the men connected with this branch of service would proceed to put up their wires.  A mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear of the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged to, and would be led in a line parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end of the wire and uncoil it as the mule was led off.  When he had walked the length of the wire the whole of it would be on the ground.  This would be done in rear of every brigade at the same time.  The ends of all the wires would then be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army.  The men, attached to brigades or divisions, would all commence at once raising the wires with their telegraph poles.  This was done by making a loop in the wire and putting it over the spike and raising the pole to a perpendicular position.  At intervals the wire would be attached to trees, or some other permanent object, so that one pole was sufficient at a place.  In the absence of such a support two poles would have to be used, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in its place.  While this was being done the telegraph wagons would take their positions near where the headquarters they belonged to were to be established, and would connect with the wire.  Thus, in a few minutes longer time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil, telegraphic communication would be effected between all the headquarters of the army.  No orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph.

The signal service was used on the march.  The men composing this corps were assigned to specified commands.  When movements were made, they would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize upon high points of ground giving a commanding view of the country, if cleared, or would climb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote, by signals, the positions of different parts of our own army, and often the movements of the enemy.  They would also take off the signals of the enemy and transmit them.  It would sometimes take too long a time to make translations of intercepted dispatches for us to receive any benefit from them.  But sometimes they gave useful information.

On the afternoon of the 7th I received news from Washington announcing that Sherman had probably attacked Johnston that day, and that Butler had reached City Point safely and taken it by surprise on the 5th.  I had given orders for a movement by the left flank, fearing that Lee might move rapidly to Richmond to crush Butler before I could get there.

My order for this movement was as follows: 

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., May 7, 1864, 6.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.

Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position at Spottsylvania C. H. with one army corps, at Todd’s Tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the Piney Branch and Spottsylvania road with the road from Alsop’s to Old Court House.  If this move is made the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the Ny River.