intrepid cavalry general, was in the West with a large
force; making a larger command necessary to hold what
we had gained in Middle and West Tennessee. We
could not abandon any territory north of the line
held by the enemy because it would lay the Northern
States open to invasion. But as the Army of the
Potomac was the principal garrison for the protection
of Washington even while it was moving on Lee, so
all the forces to the west, and the Army of the James,
guarded their special trusts when advancing from them
as well as when remaining at them. Better indeed,
for they forced the enemy to guard his own lines and
resources at a greater distance from ours, and with
a greater force. Little expeditions could not
so well be sent out to destroy a bridge or tear up
a few miles of railroad track, burn a storehouse,
or inflict other little annoyances. Accordingly
I arranged for a simultaneous movement all along the
line. Sherman was to move from Chattanooga,
Johnston’s army and Atlanta being his objective
points. (
23) Crook, commanding in West Virginia,
was to move from the mouth of the Gauley River with
a cavalry force and some artillery, the Virginia and
Tennessee Railroad to be his objective. Either
the enemy would have to keep a large force to protect
their communications, or see them destroyed and a
large amount of forage and provision, which they so
much needed, fall into our hands. Sigel was in
command in the Valley of Virginia. He was to
advance up the valley, covering the North from an
invasion through that channel as well while advancing
as by remaining near Harper’s Ferry. Every
mile he advanced also gave us possession of stores
on which Lee relied. Butler was to advance by
the James River, having Richmond and Petersburg as
his objective.
Before the advance commenced I visited Butler at Fort
Monroe. This was the first time I had ever met
him. Before giving him any order as to the part
he was to play in the approaching campaign I invited
his views. They were very much such as I intended
to direct, and as I did direct (24), in writing,
before leaving.
General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the
rank of major-general shortly after the battle of
Chattanooga on my recommendation, had not yet been
confirmed. I found a decided prejudice against
his confirmation by a majority of the Senate, but
I insisted that his services had been such that he
should be rewarded. My wishes were now reluctantly
complied with, and I assigned him to the command of
one of the corps under General Butler. I was
not long in finding out that the objections to Smith’s
promotion were well founded.